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Answer: floor
SR Bommai (1994) floor test as democratic standard: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition in States (Karnataka, Meghalaya, Nagaland) based on Governor's reports alleging loss of majority, anti-secular activities, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Floor test primary method to test majority; Governor cannot dismiss Ministry without testing majority on Assembly floor, (ii) Presidential satisfaction subject to judicial review; courts can examine if based on objective material, not political considerations, (iii) Secularism part of basic structure; State government acting against secularism can justify Article 356, (iv) Assembly dissolution not automatic; can be revived if proclamation invalidated, (c) Applications: (i) Hung Assembly scenarios: Governor must invite leader most likely to command majority, verify through floor test, not subjective assessment, (ii) Judicial review: Courts can examine Governor's report, Presidential satisfaction for objective material, constitutional compliance, (iii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against political misuse of Article 356, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Floor test as democratic standard ensures State governments reflect Assembly majority; judicial review protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach.
Answer: arbitrary
Shayara Bano (2017) triple talaq and Article 14: (a) Context: Challenge to instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) practice in Muslim personal law, (b) Supreme Court holding (3:2 majority): (i) Instant triple talaq unconstitutional: Violates Article 14 (arbitrary, manifestly unreasonable), (ii) Not essential practice of Islam protected under Article 25; religious freedom subject to Fundamental Rights scrutiny, (iii) Constitutional Morality (gender equality, dignity) overrides discriminatory religious custom, (c) Applications: (i) Legislative follow-up: Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 criminalized instant triple talaq, (ii) Broader principle: Personal laws subject to Fundamental Rights scrutiny; religious freedom (Article 25) balanced with gender equality (Articles 14, 15), (iii) Comparative cases: Joseph Shine (2018) struck down adultery law (Section 497 IPC) as violating gender equality, dignity, autonomy, (d) Rationale: (i) Equality: Arbitrary practices that treat women unequally violate Article 14; gender equality essential to constitutional identity, (ii) Religious freedom: Article 25 protects essential religious practices, not arbitrary, discriminatory customs, (iii) Constitutional Morality: Prevails over social morality; constitutional values protect marginalized against majoritarian impulses, (e) Challenges: (i) Implementation: Awareness among Muslim women about legal rights, access to justice, (ii) Social change: Legal reform requires accompanying social education, community engagement, (iii) Balance: Respect for religious diversity while protecting individual rights, especially of marginalized within communities, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Using constitutional values to reform discriminatory practices while respecting religious freedom; balance achieved through proportionality test, Constitutional Morality.
Answer: 15
Navtej Singh Johar (2018) sexual orientation and Article 15: (a) Context: Challenge to Section 377 IPC criminalizing consensual same-sex relations between adults, (b) Supreme Court holding (5-judge bench unanimous): (i) Section 377 unconstitutional to extent it criminalizes consensual adult same-sex relations, (ii) Discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination on religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth) — Court interpreted 'sex' to include sexual orientation, gender identity, (iii) Also violates Article 14 (arbitrary classification), Article 19 (expression of identity), Article 21 (privacy, dignity, autonomy), (c) Applications: (i) Decriminalization: Foundation for subsequent cases on marriage, adoption, anti-discrimination for LGBTQ+ persons, (ii) Institutional reforms: Directions for sensitization of police, judiciary, healthcare providers, (iii) Legislative follow-up: Ongoing debate on civil unions, marriage equality, anti-discrimination law, (d) Rationale: (i) Equality: Sexual orientation intrinsic to personality; discrimination violates equality, dignity, (ii) Constitutional Morality: Prevails over social morality; constitutional values (dignity, equality, liberty) protect minorities against majoritarian impulses, (iii) Inclusive interpretation: 'Sex' in Article 15 interpreted expansively to include sexual orientation, gender identity, ensuring substantive equality, (e) Challenges: (i) Social acceptance: Legal reform requires accompanying social education, community engagement, (ii) Implementation: Ensuring rights realized in practice, not just declared in judgments, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Using constitutional values to advance substantive equality for marginalized groups; inclusive interpretation of Article 15 ensures protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity.
Answer: hospital ethics
Common Cause (2018) passive euthanasia safeguards: (a) Context: Petition seeking recognition of passive euthanasia, living wills for terminally ill patients in persistent vegetative state, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Right to die with dignity part of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), (ii) Passive euthanasia (withdrawing life support) permissible for terminally ill patients in persistent vegetative state, (iii) Living will valid subject to safeguards: medical board certification, judicial oversight, hospital ethics committee review, (c) Safeguards imposed: (i) Medical board certification: Multiple doctors confirm terminal illness/vegetative state, (ii) Judicial oversight: Magistrate approval for implementing living will, (iii) Hospital ethics committee: Periodic review of decision to ensure ethical compliance, patient autonomy, (iv) Patient autonomy: Living will reflects patient's prior informed consent; family consent not mandatory if living will valid, (d) Limits: (i) Active euthanasia/assisted suicide remains illegal; only passive withdrawal of life support permitted, (ii) Procedural safeguards prevent misuse, ensure genuine patient autonomy, (e) Applications: (i) End-of-life care: Hospitals develop protocols for passive euthanasia, living will registration, ethics committee review, (ii) Legal awareness: Public education about advance medical directives, rights, procedures, (iii) Ethical guidelines: Medical councils issue guidance on end-of-life decisions, ethics committee functioning, (f) Illustrates calibrated rights balancing: Individual autonomy (right to die with dignity) balanced with sanctity of life, prevention of abuse through procedural safeguards, ethics committee oversight.
Answer: basic amenities
Chameli Singh (1996) right to shelter: (a) Context: Challenge to land acquisition for housing scheme; issue of right to shelter under Article 21, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Right to shelter is part of right to life under Article 21; shelter includes not just roof over head but adequate living space, safe structure, clean surroundings, access to basic amenities (water, sanitation, electricity, drainage), (ii) State has positive obligation to ensure access to shelter, especially for marginalized, urban poor, (iii) Balanced with public purpose: Land acquisition for housing schemes valid if for public purpose, with fair compensation, rehabilitation, (c) Applications: (i) Housing schemes: PMAY (Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana) operationalizes right to shelter through affordable housing for urban/rural poor, (ii) Slum rehabilitation: Policies balancing urban development with housing rights, ensuring in-situ upgradation, rehabilitation for displaced, (iii) Judicial enforcement: Courts award compensation for illegal eviction, direct rehabilitation for homeless, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) NFSA, MGNREGA: Complementary schemes address food, livelihood security alongside shelter, (ii) Urban planning: Municipalities incorporate right to shelter in development plans, slum rehabilitation policies, (e) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Adequate shelter essential for human dignity, health, family life, (ii) Equality: Access to shelter must not depend on economic status; State must ensure equitable access, (iii) Development: Adequate housing essential for health, education, economic productivity, social stability, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to impose positive obligations on State for shelter; judicial enforcement enables realization of socio-economic rights through State action, housing policies, urban planning.
Answer: True
Francis Coralie (1981) right to life and human dignity: (a) Context: Petition regarding conditions of preventive detainees in Tihar Jail; issue of minimum standards for humane treatment under Article 21, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Right to life under Article 21 means right to live with human dignity, not mere animal existence, (ii) Includes bare necessities: Adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, (iii) Includes facilities for development: Reading, writing, expressing oneself, social interaction, (iv) Procedural safeguards: Protection from torture, access to legal aid, family visits, medical care, (c) Applications: (i) Prison conditions: Directions for humane treatment, rehabilitation programs, vocational training, (ii) Detention facilities: Standards for preventive detention, undertrial detention to ensure dignity, rights protection, (iii) Social welfare: Basis for recognizing right to food, shelter, healthcare as part of Article 21, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) Rights expansion: Francis Coralie foundation for expanding Article 21 to include privacy, health, environment, livelihood, education, (ii) Socio-economic rights: Judicial recognition of right to food (PUCL case), shelter (Olga Tellis), healthcare (Paschim Banga) as part of Article 21, (e) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Human worth essential to constitutional identity; Article 21 interpreted to protect dignity in all state-citizen interactions, (ii) Holistic rights: Right to life encompasses physical, mental, social, spiritual dimensions of human existence, (iii) Positive obligation: State must take affirmative steps to realize dignity, not just refrain from violation, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to impose positive obligations on State for human dignity; judicial enforcement enables realization of socio-economic rights through State action, institutional mechanisms.
Answer: collective
Board of Trustees (1983) right to livelihood and regulation: (a) Context: Challenge to termination of port workers' employment; issue of right to livelihood under Article 21, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Right to livelihood is part of right to life under Article 21; no person can live without means of living, (ii) BUT State can regulate livelihood in public interest with due procedure: Fair hearing, reasonable classification, proportionality, (iii) Balance: Individual right to livelihood vs. collective welfare (public interest, administrative efficiency), (c) Applications: (i) Employment termination: Must follow fair procedure, natural justice; arbitrary termination violates Article 21, (ii) Public interest regulation: State can regulate professions, occupations for public health, safety, morality with due procedure, (iii) Proportionality test: Restrictions on livelihood must be rationally connected to legitimate aim, necessary, balanced, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) Olga Tellis (1985): Applied livelihood principle to pavement dwellers' eviction, requiring rehabilitation, (ii) MGNREGA: Operationalizes right to work/livelihood through statutory guarantee of employment, (e) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Livelihood essential for human dignity, autonomy, self-respect, (ii) Public interest: State can regulate livelihood to protect public health, safety, welfare, (iii) Procedural fairness: Due procedure ensures regulations not arbitrary, discriminatory, (f) Illustrates calibrated rights balancing: Right to livelihood balanced with collective welfare through procedural safeguards, proportionality; individual rights protected while enabling legitimate state regulation in public interest.
Answer: emergency
Parmanand Katara (1989) emergency medical care duty: (a) Context: Petition regarding denial of emergency treatment to accident victim by private hospital; issue of medical professionals' duty to provide emergency care, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Every doctor (government or private) has duty to provide emergency medical care to accident victims, regardless of legal formalities, payment capacity, (ii) Right to life under Article 21 includes right to emergency treatment; preservation of life paramount, (iii) Legal formalities (police report, payment) cannot delay emergency medical care, (c) Applications: (i) Medical ethics: Medical Council of India incorporated emergency care duty in professional ethics code, (ii) Hospital policies: Hospitals established protocols for emergency care, triage systems to prioritize life-saving treatment, (iii) Legal protection: Doctors providing emergency care in good faith protected from legal liability, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) Clinical Establishments Act: Standards for emergency care in registered healthcare facilities, (ii) Judicial enforcement: Courts award compensation for denial of emergency care, direct systemic reforms, (e) Rationale: (i) Sanctity of life: Preservation of life paramount; emergency care essential for saving lives, (ii) Professional duty: Medical profession has ethical, legal duty to preserve life, alleviate suffering, (iii) Public trust: Public relies on medical professionals for emergency care; duty reinforces trust in healthcare system, (f) Illustrates dignity-centric constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to require emergency medical care as foundation for preserving life, dignity; professional duty operationalizes constitutional values in healthcare delivery.
Answer: 21
Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) bonded labour and Article 21: (a) Context: Petition regarding bonded labour in stone quarries of Haryana; issue of State's obligation to release, rehabilitate bonded labourers, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Bonded labour violates right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 (dignity, autonomy), (ii) State has positive obligation to identify, release, rehabilitate bonded labourers, (iii) Used PIL mechanism: Relaxed locus standi to enable public-spirited organizations to file for marginalized groups unable to approach courts, (c) Applications: (i) Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976: Court directed effective implementation, rehabilitation schemes, (ii) Judicial monitoring: Courts periodically review implementation, direct compensation, rehabilitation for released labourers, (iii) Awareness: Legal literacy programs empower bonded labourers to claim rights, access justice, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) Rehabilitation schemes: State/Central governments implement rehabilitation packages (land, housing, skill training) for released labourers, (ii) Monitoring mechanisms: District-level committees monitor identification, release, rehabilitation of bonded labourers, (e) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Bonded labour violates human dignity, autonomy; Article 21 requires State to protect vulnerable groups, (ii) Positive obligation: State must take affirmative steps to realize rights, not just refrain from violation, (iii) Social justice: Releasing bonded labourers advances substantive equality, social transformation, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to impose positive obligations on State for marginalized groups; PIL enables judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights through State action.
Answer: 21
Suchita Srivastava (2009) reproductive rights and autonomy: (a) Context: Petition regarding termination of pregnancy for mentally challenged woman; broader issue of reproductive autonomy, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Reproductive choices part of personal liberty, privacy, dignity under Article 21, (ii) Women have right to make decisions about pregnancy, childbirth, family planning without state interference, (iii) Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 operationalizes right to safe, legal abortion within gestational limits, (c) Applications: (i) Access: Ensuring availability, affordability, accessibility of reproductive healthcare, especially for marginalized groups, (ii) Quality: Standards for safe abortion, maternal care, contraception counseling, (iii) Non-discrimination: Ensuring reproductive rights for all, regardless of marital status, caste, class, disability, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) MTP Act amendments (2021): Expanded gestational limits, included unmarried women, recognized reproductive autonomy, (ii) Emerging jurisprudence: Courts increasingly recognize reproductive justice as part of substantive equality, dignity, (e) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Reproductive autonomy essential for women's dignity, self-determination, (ii) Equality: Reproductive rights enable women's equal participation in social, economic, political life, (iii) Health: Safe reproductive healthcare essential for maternal health, child welfare, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to include reproductive autonomy; statutory framework operationalizes rights with calibrated safeguards balancing autonomy, health, public interest.
Answer: destroyed
Golak Nath (1967) Fundamental Rights and amendment power: (a) Context: Challenge to constitutional amendments affecting property rights (Articles 19(1)(f), 31); issue whether Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights, (b) Supreme Court holding (6:5): (i) Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights under Article 368; Fundamental Rights are 'transcendental and immutable', (ii) Article 368 only prescribes procedure for amendment, not substantive power to amend Fundamental Rights, (iii) Applied prospective overruling: Judgment applies only to future amendments, not past amendments affecting property rights, (c) Later modification: (i) Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Modified Golak Nath; held Parliament can amend any provision including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter 'basic structure' of Constitution, (ii) Balance: Fundamental Rights can be abridged but not destroyed if part of basic structure, (iii) Rationale: Enables constitutional adaptation while preserving core identity, (d) Applications: (i) Property rights: Golak Nath protected property rights; subsequent amendments (44th Amendment) removed property as Fundamental Right but retained constitutional protection, (ii) Basic structure: Kesavananda enabled balanced approach — amendments possible but core values protected, (e) Rationale for evolution: (i) Constitutional flexibility: Golak Nath's absolute bar on FR amendments too rigid; Kesavananda enabled adaptation while preserving core, (ii) Democratic legitimacy: Parliament needs flexibility to address contemporary challenges, but core values must be protected, (iii) Rights protection: Basic structure doctrine ensures Fundamental Rights forming part of core remain protected, (f) Illustrates constitutional evolution: Golak Nath represented strong rights protection; Kesavananda calibrated approach enables constitutional adaptation while preserving core identity; balance between flexibility, permanence essential to living constitutionalism.
Answer: objective
Rameshwar Prasad (2006) Governor's report and objective material: (a) Context: Bihar Assembly elections 2005 resulted in hung Assembly; Governor recommended President's Rule citing horse-trading based on media reports, without floor test, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Governor's satisfaction must be based on objective material, not unverified media reports or political considerations, (ii) Floor test is primary method to test majority; Governor cannot pre-empt Assembly's right to test majority, (iii) Dissolution of Assembly is extreme step; revival possible if proclamation invalidated, (c) SR Bommai reinforcement: (i) Presidential satisfaction subject to judicial review, (ii) Floor test as democratic standard for majority verification, (iii) Secularism part of basic structure; State action against secularism can justify Article 356, (iv) Assembly dissolution not automatic; can be revived if proclamation struck down, (d) Applications: (i) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Reiterated objective standards for Article 356 invocation, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (e) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (f) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Judicial review as guardian of federal balance; objective standards protect State autonomy within unified framework.
Answer: violence
Kedar Nath Singh (1962) sedition law limitations: (a) Context: Challenge to constitutionality of Section 124A IPC (sedition) as violating freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Upheld constitutionality of sedition law but read down its scope, (ii) Sedition applies only to acts inciting violence or public disorder, not mere criticism of government, (iii) Reasonable restriction: Sedition law valid under Article 19(2) as reasonable restriction for public order, security of State, (c) Applications: (i) Free speech protection: Legitimate criticism, dissent, protest protected; only incitement to violence punishable, (ii) National security: Genuine threats to sovereignty, integrity addressed through calibrated legal provisions, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts scrutinize charges to prevent misuse against political dissent, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) S.G. Vombatkere (2022): SC put on hold Section 124A pending government review; noted potential misuse against free speech, (ii) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (2024): Replaced sedition with narrower provision requiring intent/tendency to incite violence or public disorder, (e) Rationale: (i) Democratic discourse: Criticism of government essential for accountability, democratic participation, (ii) Public order: Incitement to violence threatens social harmony, security, (iii) Proportionality: Restrictions on speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate aim, (f) Illustrates calibrated rights balancing: Freedom of speech essential for democracy; proportionality ensures sedition restrictions justified, not arbitrary, preserving democratic discourse while protecting public order.
Answer: 21A
Unnikrishnan (1993) right to education evolution: (a) Context: Challenge to capitation fees, commercialization of medical/engineering education; broader issue of right to education, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Right to education up to age 14 is fundamental right implicit in Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), (ii) Education beyond age 14 subject to State's economic capacity, (iii) Private educational institutions subject to reasonable regulation to prevent commercialization, (c) Constitutional amendment: (i) 86th Amendment (2002): Inserted Article 21A making education for children aged 6-14 a Fundamental Right, (ii) Modified Article 45: Early childhood care and education for children below age 6, (iii) Added Fundamental Duty (Article 51A(k)): Parents/guardians to provide opportunities for education to children aged 6-14, (d) Applications: (i) RTE Act, 2009: Operationalizes Article 21A with norms for infrastructure, teacher qualifications, 25% reservation in private schools, (ii) Judicial oversight: Courts monitor implementation of RTE, address violations, (iii) Illustrates judicial legislation prompting constitutional amendment: Court's recognition of right to education led to constitutional entrenchment, (e) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Education essential for human dignity, autonomy, democratic participation, (ii) Equality: Education reduces social inequalities, enables substantive equality, (iii) Development: Educated citizens essential for economic growth, social progress, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Judicial interpretation prompting constitutional amendment; Article 21 expanded to include education as foundation for realizing other rights.
Answer: 21
Hussainara Khatoon (1979) right to speedy trial: (a) Context: Petition regarding undertrial prisoners in Bihar detained for periods longer than maximum sentence for alleged offences, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Right to speedy trial implicit in Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), (ii) Detention without trial violates personal liberty; undertrials detained longer than maximum sentence must be released, (iii) Procedural due process: Fair, timely justice essential for enforcing Fundamental Rights, (c) Applications: (i) Release of undertrials: Thousands released following judgment, reducing prison overcrowding, (ii) Legal aid expansion: Foundation for Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 establishing NALSA for free legal aid, (iii) Prison reforms: Directions for humane treatment, rehabilitation programs, vocational training, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) P. Ramachandra Rao (2002): Clarified no fixed time limit for speedy trial; courts balance nature of offence, delay reasons, prejudice to parties, (ii) Fast Track Courts: Established for expedited trial of serious offences (sexual offences, POCSO cases), (e) Rationale: (i) Liberty protection: Prolonged detention without trial violates personal liberty, dignity, (ii) Justice delivery: Timely justice essential for rights protection, public confidence in legal system, (iii) Resource optimization: Reducing undertrial detention alleviates prison overcrowding, focuses resources on genuine cases, (f) Illustrates procedural due process: Article 21 interpreted to require not just fair trial but timely trial; institutional reforms operationalize constitutional right through case management, specialized courts.
Answer: 21
Common Cause (2018) right to die with dignity: (a) Context: Petition seeking recognition of passive euthanasia, living wills for terminally ill patients in persistent vegetative state, (b) Supreme Court holding (5-judge bench): (i) Right to die with dignity part of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), (ii) Passive euthanasia (withdrawing life support) permissible for terminally ill patients in persistent vegetative state, (iii) Living will valid subject to safeguards: medical board certification, judicial oversight, etc., (c) Safeguards imposed: (i) Medical board certification: Multiple doctors confirm terminal illness/vegetative state, (ii) Judicial oversight: Magistrate approval for implementing living will, (iii) Hospital ethics committee: Periodic review of decision, (iv) Patient autonomy: Living will reflects patient's prior informed consent; family consent not mandatory if living will valid, (d) Limits: (i) Active euthanasia/assisted suicide remains illegal; only passive withdrawal of life support permitted, (ii) Procedural safeguards prevent misuse, ensure genuine patient autonomy, (e) Applications: (i) End-of-life care: Hospitals develop protocols for passive euthanasia, living will registration, (ii) Legal awareness: Public education about advance medical directives, rights, procedures, (iii) Ethical guidelines: Medical councils issue guidance on end-of-life decisions, (f) Illustrates calibrated rights balancing: Individual autonomy (right to die with dignity) balanced with sanctity of life, prevention of abuse through procedural safeguards.
Answer: creamy
Indra Sawhney (1992) creamy layer concept: (a) Context: Challenge to Mandal Commission recommendations implementing 27% OBC reservation in government jobs, (b) Supreme Court holding (9-judge bench): (i) Upheld 27% OBC reservation applying reasonable classification test under Article 14, (ii) Introduced 'creamy layer' exclusion: Advanced sections within OBCs (based on income, occupation, education) excluded from reservation benefits, (iii) 50% ceiling on total reservation (with exceptions for extraordinary situations), (c) Applications: (i) OBC reservation: Creamy layer exclusion applied to education, employment reservations, (ii) Subsequent extension: Jarnail Singh (2018) applied creamy layer to SC/ST promotions, though Davinder Singh (2024) focused on sub-classification, (iii) State implementation: States maintain creamy layer lists, update income criteria, verify applications, (d) Rationale: (i) Substantive equality: Ensure benefits reach neediest within OBCs; advanced sections excluded to prevent reverse discrimination, (ii) Proportionality: Balances affirmative action with merit; 50% ceiling balances equality goals with efficiency, (iii) Empirical basis: Classification based on social, educational, economic indicators, not presumption, (e) Illustrates calibrated affirmative action: Reasonable classification enables substantive equality while preventing overbreadth; empirical basis ensures reservations achieve transformative justice without undermining merit.
Answer: basic structure
I.R. Coelho (2007) Ninth Schedule review: (a) Context: Challenge to laws placed in Ninth Schedule (immune from judicial review under Article 31B) after Kesavananda judgment; petitioners argued such laws can violate fundamental rights, (b) Supreme Court holding (9-judge bench): (i) Laws placed in Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 subject to basic structure review, (ii) If such laws violate fundamental rights forming part of basic structure (e.g., Articles 14, 19, 21), they can be struck down despite Ninth Schedule protection, (iii) Test: Whether law damages/destroys basic structure features (democracy, secularism, equality, etc.), (c) Applications: (i) Post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws: Subject to judicial scrutiny for basic structure compliance, (ii) Fundamental rights as basic structure: Articles 14 (equality), 19 (freedoms), 21 (life/liberty) form part of basic structure; laws violating these core rights can be invalidated, (iii) Balancing test: Courts examine whether law's object, impact destroys basic structure features, (d) Rationale: (i) Prevent constitutional bypass: Ninth Schedule cannot be used to enact laws violating core constitutional values, (ii) Basic structure supremacy: No constitutional provision (including Article 31B) can override basic structure doctrine, (iii) Rights protection: Ensures fundamental rights forming part of basic structure remain protected against legislative excess, (e) Illustrates basic structure enforcement: Ninth Schedule immunity not absolute; post-Kesavananda laws subject to basic structure review, ensuring constitutional core values protected against legislative attempts to bypass judicial review.
Answer: 14
Shayara Bano (2017) gender justice in personal law: (a) Context: Challenge to instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) practice in Muslim personal law, (b) Supreme Court holding (3:2 majority): (i) Instant triple talaq unconstitutional: Violates Article 14 (arbitrary, manifestly unreasonable), (ii) Not essential practice of Islam protected under Article 25, (iii) Constitutional Morality (gender equality, dignity) overrides discriminatory religious custom, (c) Applications: (i) Legislative follow-up: Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 criminalized instant triple talaq, (ii) Broader principle: Personal laws subject to Fundamental Rights scrutiny; religious freedom (Article 25) balanced with gender equality (Articles 14, 15), (iii) Comparative cases: Joseph Shine (2018) struck down adultery law (Section 497 IPC) as violating gender equality, dignity, autonomy, (d) Challenges: (i) Implementation: Awareness among Muslim women about legal rights, access to justice, (ii) Social change: Legal reform requires accompanying social education, community engagement, (iii) Balance: Respect for religious diversity while protecting individual rights, especially of marginalized within communities, (e) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Using constitutional values to reform discriminatory practices while respecting religious freedom; balance achieved through proportionality test, Constitutional Morality.
Answer: Puttaswamy
Dignity foundation in basic structure values: (a) Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017): 9-judge bench unanimously held right to privacy is intrinsic to life and liberty under Article 21; also part of freedoms under Article 19 and equality under Article 14, (b) Dignity dimensions: (i) Spatial (control over physical space), (ii) Decisional (autonomy over personal choices), (iii) Informational (control over personal data), (c) Basic structure values application: (i) Privacy not absolute; subject to proportionality test balancing individual rights vs state interests (security, welfare efficiency), (ii) Foundation for subsequent judgments: Aadhaar authentication limits, decriminalization of homosexuality (Navtej Singh Johar), reproductive rights, digital privacy (Anuradha Bhasin), (d) Broader principle: Basic structure values require state action to respect individual dignity — not just avoid physical harm but protect autonomy, privacy, self-determination, (e) Balance: Individual dignity vs collective welfare; proportionality test ensures restrictions justified, not arbitrary, (f) Illustrates dignity-centric basic structure: Human worth as foundational value guiding interpretation and application of rights; basic structure doctrine protects dignity against legislative/executive excess.