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In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court emphasized that Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be based on democratic verification of loss of majority through:
- Media reports
- Floor test in Assembly
- Party consultations
- Public opinion polls
Answer: Floor test in Assembly
Democratic verification under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition without democratic verification of loss of majority, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Governor's report should be based on democratic verification of loss of majority through floor test in Assembly, (ii) Floor test ensures elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (iii) Governor cannot send report based on subjective assessment, media reports, political considerations without floor test, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down Article 356 proclamations without floor test, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected Assembly represents people's will; floor test ensures Ministry reflects Assembly majority, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Floor test as democratic verification ensures State governments reflect Assembly majority; judicial review protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, financial relations between Union and States can be modified under Article 354. Which of the following modifications is permitted?
- Permanent transfer of State revenues to Union
- Temporary modification of revenue distribution approved by Parliament
- Abolition of Finance Commission
- Suspension of State budget approval process
Answer: Temporary modification of revenue distribution approved by Parliament
Financial relations modification during Emergency: (a) Article 354: During Emergency, President may modify distribution of revenues between Union and States (e.g., tax devolution, grants-in-aid), (b) Permitted modifications: (i) Temporary modification of revenue distribution (e.g., adjusting tax devolution percentages, grants-in-aid amounts), (ii) Must be approved by Parliament within specified timeframe, (iii) Ceases post-Emergency unless re-approved; federal fiscal normalcy restored, (c) NOT permitted: (i) Permanent transfer of State revenues to Union (violates federal balance), (ii) Abolition of Finance Commission (constitutional body with independent mandate), (iii) Suspension of State budget approval process (violates State legislative autonomy), (d) Rationale: Enable coordinated fiscal response to crisis (e.g., war financing, disaster relief) while preserving Parliamentary oversight, State autonomy post-crisis, (e) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Fiscal adjustments for defence spending, resource mobilization, (ii) Post-Emergency: Modifications ceased; Finance Commission recommendations resumed normal operation, (f) Illustrates calibrated fiscal federalism: Enabling coordinated fiscal response to existential threats while preserving State autonomy through Parliamentary approval, time limits, sunset provisions.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court distinguished between 'constitutional breakdown' and 'political instability'. Which of the following best describes 'constitutional breakdown' justifying Article 356?
- Change of government through democratic elections
- Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution
- Disagreement between State and Union on policy matters
- Electoral defeat of ruling party in State
Answer: Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution
Constitutional breakdown vs political instability: (a) SR Bommai distinction: (i) Constitutional breakdown: Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution (e.g., loss of majority verified through floor test, breakdown of law and order beyond State control, action against constitutional principles), (ii) Political instability: Change of government through democratic process, policy disagreement, electoral defeat — NOT justification for Article 356, (b) Examples of constitutional breakdown: (i) Loss of majority verified through floor test, (ii) Breakdown of law and order beyond State control, (iii) Action against constitutional principles (secularism, democracy), (c) Examples NOT justifying Article 356: (i) Political instability, change of government through democratic process, (ii) Policy disagreement with Union, (iii) Electoral defeat of ruling party, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down Article 356 proclamations based on political instability, not genuine constitutional breakdown, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: 'Constitutional breakdown' narrowly defined to protect State autonomy; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine crises, not political convenience.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, India's obligations under international human rights treaties:
- Are automatically suspended
- Continue to apply, and Emergency measures must comply with international law principles of necessity, proportionality
- Are replaced by domestic emergency laws
- Apply only to Union government, not State governments
Answer: Continue to apply, and Emergency measures must comply with international law principles of necessity, proportionality
International law during Emergency: (a) Constitutional principle: India's international obligations continue during Emergency; domestic law interpreted to comply with international law where possible, (b) International human rights law: (i) Treaties like ICCPR permit derogation from certain rights during public emergency, but core rights (life, prohibition of torture) non-derogable, (ii) Principles of necessity, proportionality: Emergency measures must be necessary for crisis response, proportionate to threat, (iii) Judicial interpretation: Indian courts increasingly refer to international law principles in interpreting constitutional provisions, including Emergency powers, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1978: Courts examine whether Emergency measures comply with international law principles of necessity, proportionality, (ii) Rights protection: Ensures Emergency measures respect core human rights, even during crisis, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional supremacy: International law informs constitutional interpretation, especially for rights protection, (ii) Democratic legitimacy: India's international commitments reflect democratic consensus on human rights, (iii) Global accountability: Compliance with international law enhances India's global standing, democratic credibility, (e) Illustrates constitutional internationalism: International law principles inform Emergency powers interpretation; balance between crisis response capacity and human rights protection through necessity, proportionality principles.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that secularism is part of the basic structure. Which of the following political party actions would likely violate secularism and justify Article 356?
- Party manifesto promising economic reforms
- Party using religious symbols for electoral mobilization in violation of election laws
- Party criticizing Union government policies
- Party forming coalition with regional parties
Answer: Party using religious symbols for electoral mobilization in violation of election laws
Secularism and political parties under SR Bommai: (a) SR Bommai holding: Secularism part of basic structure; State government acting against secularism can justify Article 356, (b) Political party actions violating secularism: (i) Using religious symbols for electoral mobilization in violation of election laws (e.g., R.P. Act provisions against appeal to religion), (ii) Promoting communal violence, religious discrimination through official policy, (iii) Enacting laws discriminating based on religion (violates Articles 14, 15, 25-28), (c) Actions NOT violating secularism: (i) Economic policy promises (policy domain within State competence), (ii) Criticizing Union policies (democratic dissent protected), (iii) Forming coalitions (normal political practice), (d) Judicial scrutiny: Courts examine whether action genuinely threatens constitutional secularism, not mere political disagreement or policy difference, (e) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to uphold Article 356 for genuine secularism violations, strike down for political pretext, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy while enabling Union to preserve constitutional order, (f) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Secularism as basic structure enables Union to preserve constitutional order; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine threats, not political convenience.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the federal structure of the Constitution:
- Is permanently converted to unitary system
- Temporarily acquires unitary features but reverts to federal structure post-Emergency
- Is suspended entirely until Emergency ceases
- Is replaced by military administration
Answer: Temporarily acquires unitary features but reverts to federal structure post-Emergency
Federalism during Emergency: (a) Constitutional design: Indian federalism has unitary bias; Emergency provisions enable temporary unitary features for crisis management, (b) Temporary unitary features during Emergency: (i) Legislative: Parliament can legislate on State List (Article 250), (ii) Executive: Union can give directions to States on manner of executive power exercise (Article 353), (iii) Financial: President can modify revenue distribution (Article 354), (c) Post-Emergency restoration: (i) Parliament's laws on State List cease after 6 months, (ii) State executive resumes full autonomy, (iii) Federal fiscal normalcy restored, (d) Rationale: Ensure unified national response to existential threats while preserving federal structure for post-crisis governance, (e) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Temporary unitary features for defence coordination, post-Emergency federal normalcy restored, (ii) Federal balance: Emergency powers enable crisis response without permanent centralization, (f) Illustrates adaptive federalism: Temporary unitary features for crisis management within constitutional framework; balance between national security and State autonomy through time limits, sunset provisions.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that Governor's report recommending President's Rule must be based on floor test results where possible. What is the primary rationale for this requirement?
- To expedite dismissal of State governments
- To ensure democratic verification of loss of majority through elected representatives
- To enhance Governor's discretionary powers
- To reduce judicial review scope
Answer: To ensure democratic verification of loss of majority through elected representatives
Floor test rationale under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition without floor test in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Floor test primary method to verify whether Ministry enjoys majority support in Assembly, (ii) Governor cannot dismiss Ministry based on subjective assessment, media reports, political considerations without floor test, (iii) Floor test ensures democratic verification: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (c) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected Assembly represents people's will; floor test ensures Ministry reflects Assembly majority, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down Article 356 proclamations without floor test, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Floor test as democratic standard ensures State governments reflect Assembly majority; judicial review protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the powers of State Legislature:
- Are completely abolished and taken over by Parliament
- Continue to exist but Parliament can legislate on State List subjects under Article 250
- Are suspended until Emergency ceases
- Are transferred to Governor permanently
Answer: Continue to exist but Parliament can legislate on State List subjects under Article 250
State Legislature during Emergency: (a) Article 250: During Emergency, Parliament can legislate on any matter in State List, (b) State Legislature continuity: (i) State Legislature not abolished; continues to function, (ii) Parliament's concurrent power: Parliament can legislate on State List subjects for coordinated crisis response, (iii) Conflict resolution: Union law prevails in case of conflict with State law (Article 254), (iv) Post-Emergency: Parliament's laws on State List cease after 6 months; State Legislature resumes exclusive power, (c) Rationale: Enable unified national response to existential threats while preserving State legislative domain post-crisis, (d) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Parliament legislated on defence, security matters affecting States, (ii) Post-Emergency: Parliament's laws ceased after 6 months; State legislative autonomy restored, (e) Illustrates adaptive federalism: Temporary enhancement of Union legislative power for crisis management, reversible post-Emergency to restore State autonomy; balance between national security and federal autonomy.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court emphasized that 'breakdown of constitutional machinery' under Article 356 refers to:
- Political instability or change of government through democratic process
- Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution
- Disagreement between State and Union on policy matters
- Electoral defeat of ruling party in State
Answer: Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution
Constitutional breakdown definition under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition based on political instability, not genuine constitutional breakdown, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) 'Breakdown of constitutional machinery' means genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution, not mere political instability, (ii) Examples: Loss of majority verified through floor test, breakdown of law and order beyond State control, action against constitutional principles (secularism, democracy), (iii) NOT examples: Political instability, change of government through democratic process, policy disagreement with Union, electoral defeat, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down Article 356 proclamations based on political instability, not genuine constitutional breakdown, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected State governments represent people's will; Article 356 exceptional measure, not routine tool, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor, President act as constitutional functionaries, not political agents, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: 'Breakdown of constitutional machinery' narrowly defined to protect State autonomy; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine crises, not political convenience.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, financial relations between Union and States can be modified under Article 354. Which of the following best describes this modification?
- Union can permanently take over State revenues
- President may modify revenue distribution, but modifications must be approved by Parliament and cease post-Emergency
- States lose all financial autonomy permanently
- Finance Commission recommendations become binding on Union
Answer: President may modify revenue distribution, but modifications must be approved by Parliament and cease post-Emergency
Financial relations during Emergency: (a) Article 354: During Emergency, President may modify distribution of revenues between Union and States (e.g., tax devolution, grants-in-aid), (b) Parliamentary approval: Modifications must be approved by Parliament within specified timeframe, (c) Temporal limitation: Modifications cease post-Emergency unless re-approved; federal fiscal normalcy restored, (d) Rationale: Enable coordinated fiscal response to crisis (e.g., war financing, disaster relief) while preserving Parliamentary oversight, State autonomy post-crisis, (e) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Fiscal adjustments for defence spending, resource mobilization, (ii) Post-Emergency: Modifications ceased; Finance Commission recommendations resumed normal operation, (f) Illustrates calibrated fiscal federalism: Enabling coordinated fiscal response to existential threats while preserving State autonomy through Parliamentary approval, time limits, sunset provisions.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that secularism is part of the basic structure. Which of the following State actions would likely justify Article 356 imposition based on secularism violation?
- State government promoting regional language in education
- State government enacting law that discriminates against citizens based on religion
- State government implementing Central welfare schemes
- State government requesting additional funds from Union
Answer: State government enacting law that discriminates against citizens based on religion
Secularism test for Article 356: (a) SR Bommai holding: Secularism part of basic structure; State government acting against secularism can justify Article 356, (b) Actions justifying Article 356 based on secularism violation: (i) Enacting laws discriminating based on religion (violates Articles 14, 15, 25-28), (ii) Promoting communal violence, religious discrimination, (iii) Undermining constitutional secularism through official policy, (c) Actions NOT justifying Article 356: (i) Promoting regional language (cultural policy within State domain), (ii) Implementing Central schemes (cooperative federalism), (iii) Requesting funds (normal fiscal federalism), (d) Judicial scrutiny: Courts examine whether action genuinely threatens constitutional secularism, not mere political disagreement or policy difference, (e) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to uphold Article 356 for genuine secularism violations, strike down for political pretext, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy while enabling Union to preserve constitutional order, (f) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Secularism as basic structure enables Union to preserve constitutional order; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine threats, not political convenience.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the distribution of legislative powers between Union and States is temporarily modified. Which of the following best describes this modification?
- State List subjects become exclusively Union subjects permanently
- Parliament can legislate on State List subjects, but such laws cease 6 months post-Emergency
- State Legislatures lose all legislative powers permanently
- Concurrent List subjects become Union-exclusive permanently
Answer: Parliament can legislate on State List subjects, but such laws cease 6 months post-Emergency
Legislative powers during Emergency: (a) Article 250: During Emergency, Parliament can legislate on any matter in State List, (b) Temporal limitation: Laws made under Article 250 cease to operate 6 months after Emergency ceases, except for things done/omitted before expiry, (c) Rationale: Enable unified national response to existential threats while preserving State legislative domain post-crisis, (d) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Parliament legislated on defence, security matters affecting States, (ii) Post-Emergency: Laws ceased after 6 months unless re-enacted by Parliament/State Legislatures, (e) Federal balance: Temporary enhancement of Union legislative power for crisis management, reversible post-Emergency to restore federal normalcy, (f) Illustrates adaptive federalism: Enabling coordinated national response to existential threats while preserving State autonomy through time limits, sunset provisions.
Under Article 163, the Governor acts on aid and advice of Council of Ministers except in limited discretionary situations. Which of the following is a legitimate discretionary power of Governor under Article 356?
- Dismissing Ministry based on subjective assessment without floor test
- Sending report to President based on objective material of constitutional breakdown
- Appointing Chief Minister based on political preference
- Dissolving Assembly without Parliamentary approval
Answer: Sending report to President based on objective material of constitutional breakdown
Governor's discretionary powers under Article 356: (a) Constitutional framework: Article 163 - Governor acts on aid and advice of Council of Ministers except in limited discretionary situations, (b) Legitimate discretion under Article 356: (i) Sending report to President based on objective material of constitutional breakdown (e.g., loss of majority verified through floor test, breakdown of constitutional machinery), (ii) NOT legitimate: Dismissing Ministry without floor test, appointing CM based on political preference, dissolving Assembly without Parliamentary approval, (c) SR Bommai safeguards: (i) Objective material requirement: Report must be based on verified facts, not subjective opinion, (ii) Floor test principle: Majority tested on Assembly floor, not Governor's assessment, (iii) Judicial review: Courts examine whether report based on objective material, not political considerations, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Governors more cautious in recommending President's Rule; floor test, objective material required, (ii) Judicial oversight: Courts strike down proclamations based on unverified reports, political considerations, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Governor's discretion limited to genuine constitutional breakdown; safeguards protect State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the executive power of States:
- Is completely abolished and taken over by Union
- Continues to exist but Union can give directions on manner of exercise for coordinated crisis response
- Is transferred to Governor permanently
- Is suspended until Emergency ceases
Answer: Continues to exist but Union can give directions on manner of exercise for coordinated crisis response
State executive during Emergency: (a) Article 353(b): During Emergency, Union executive power extends to giving directions to States on 'manner of exercise' of executive power, (b) State executive continuity: (i) State executive not abolished; Governor, Council of Ministers continue to function, (ii) Union directions relate to coordinated crisis response (defence, security, resource allocation), not general policy, (iii) Post-Emergency: State executive resumes full autonomy; Union directions cease, (c) Rationale: Ensure unified national response to existential threats while preserving State executive structure for post-crisis restoration, (d) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Union directions for defence coordination, resource mobilization, (ii) Post-Emergency: State executive autonomy restored; federal normalcy resumed, (e) Illustrates federal flexibility: Temporary enhancement of Union executive control for crisis management, reversible post-Emergency to restore State autonomy; balance between national security and federal autonomy.
During a Financial Emergency under Article 360, the Union can give directions to States on financial matters. Which of the following is NOT a direction permitted under Article 360?
- Reduction of salaries of State government employees
- Reservation of money Bills for Presidential consideration
- Dissolution of State Legislature
- Observance of principles of financial propriety
Answer: Dissolution of State Legislature
Article 360 permitted directions: (a) Constitutional provision: During Financial Emergency, Union can give directions to States on: (i) Reduction of salaries of State government employees, constitutional functionaries, (ii) Reservation of money Bills for Presidential consideration, (iii) Observance of principles of financial propriety, (b) NOT permitted: Dissolution of State Legislature — Article 360 does not authorize Union to dissolve State Legislatures; that power exists only under Article 356 (President's Rule) for constitutional breakdown, not financial crisis, (c) Rationale: Enable coordinated fiscal response to crisis while preserving State legislative autonomy; financial Emergency addresses fiscal stability, not political governance, (d) Applications: (i) Historical non-use: Article 360 never invoked, reflecting preference for cooperative fiscal mechanisms, (ii) Alternative mechanisms: Finance Commission, FRBM Acts, GST Council address fiscal challenges without Emergency powers, (e) Illustrates calibrated fiscal federalism: Financial Emergency powers limited to fiscal matters; State legislative autonomy preserved unless separate constitutional breakdown under Article 356.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that secularism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Which of the following best describes the implication of this holding for Article 356?
- States can promote any religion without constitutional limits
- State governments acting against secularism can justify imposition of President's Rule
- Secularism applies only to Union government, not States
- Secularism can be amended by simple majority in Parliament
Answer: State governments acting against secularism can justify imposition of President's Rule
SR Bommai secularism and Article 356: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition in States alleging anti-secular activities, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Secularism part of basic structure; cannot be amended even by constitutional amendment, (ii) State government acting against secularism can justify Article 356 imposition, (iii) But Presidential satisfaction subject to judicial review; courts examine whether action genuinely against secularism, not political pretext, (c) Applications: (i) Secularism test: State policies promoting religious discrimination, communal violence can trigger Article 356, (ii) Judicial scrutiny: Courts examine whether action genuinely threatens constitutional secularism, not mere political disagreement, (iii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy while enabling Union to preserve constitutional order, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional identity: Secularism essential to Indian constitutionalism (Preamble, Articles 25-28), (ii) Democratic legitimacy: Union duty to preserve constitutional order against State action undermining secularism, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Secularism as basic structure enables Union to preserve constitutional order; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine threats, not political convenience.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court emphasized that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule must be based on:
- Subjective satisfaction of Governor
- Objective material verified through independent sources
- Political considerations of ruling party at Centre
- Media reports without verification
Answer: Objective material verified through independent sources
SR Bommai Governor's report standards: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition based on Governor's reports in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Governor's satisfaction must be based on objective material, not subjective opinion or political consideration, (ii) Material should be verified through independent sources (Assembly proceedings, independent inquiries, not just media reports), (iii) Floor test primary method to test majority; Governor cannot dismiss Ministry without testing majority on Assembly floor, (c) Applications: (i) Rameshwar Prasad (2006): Struck down Bihar Assembly dissolution based on unverified media reports, (ii) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Reiterated objective standards for Article 356 invocation, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Objective material requirement protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach; judicial review ensures Governor acts within constitutional limits.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that dissolution of State Assembly under Article 356 is not automatic and can be revived if the proclamation is struck down by courts. This safeguard primarily protects:
- Union executive power
- State legislative autonomy and democratic mandate
- Judicial supremacy over Parliament
- Governor's discretionary powers
Answer: State legislative autonomy and democratic mandate
SR Bommai Assembly dissolution safeguard: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition with Assembly dissolution in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Assembly dissolution not automatic consequence of Article 356 proclamation, (ii) If proclamation struck down by court, Assembly can be revived with Ministry restored, (iii) Floor test primary method to test majority before dissolution considered, (c) Rationale: (i) Democratic mandate: Elected Assembly represents people's will; dissolution should be last resort, not first step, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach, (iii) Constitutional morality: Governor, President act as constitutional functionaries, not political agents, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to revive Assemblies if proclamation invalidated, (ii) Political accountability: Governments must justify dissolution with objective material, not political convenience, (e) Illustrates democratic federalism: Assembly dissolution safeguard ensures State legislative autonomy protected; judicial review prevents arbitrary deprivation of democratic mandate.
Under Article 352, a proclamation of National Emergency must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within ______ month(s) by special majority, failing which the Emergency ceases to operate.
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 6
Answer: 1
Article 352 Parliamentary approval: (a) Constitutional text: Emergency proclamation must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within 1 month of issuance, (b) Special majority requirement: Approval requires majority of total membership of each House + 2/3 of members present and voting, (c) Duration: If approved, Emergency continues for 6 months; can be extended indefinitely by Parliamentary resolution every 6 months, (d) 44th Amendment safeguards (1978): (i) Special majority (not simple majority) required for approval, (ii) Emergency expires after 6 months unless renewed, (iii) One-tenth of Lok Sabha members can requisition special meeting to consider revocation, (e) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Approved by Parliament, focused on external threats, (ii) 1975 Emergency: Approved but later criticized for political misuse; led to 44th Amendment safeguards, (f) Illustrates democratic oversight: Parliamentary approval ensures Emergency reflects democratic consensus, not executive whim; special majority prevents narrow majorities from imposing Emergency.
The 44th Constitutional Amendment Act (1978) introduced key safeguards against misuse of Emergency provisions. Which of the following was NOT a safeguard introduced by this Amendment?
- 'Internal disturbance' replaced with 'armed rebellion' in Article 352
- Written advice of Cabinet required for Emergency proclamation
- Fundamental Rights under Articles 20-21 cannot be suspended during Emergency
- Emergency automatically expires after 3 months without Parliamentary renewal
Answer: Emergency automatically expires after 3 months without Parliamentary renewal
44th Amendment Emergency safeguards: (a) Key safeguards introduced (1978): (i) 'Internal disturbance' replaced with 'armed rebellion' in Article 352 to prevent political misuse, (ii) Written advice of Cabinet (not just PM) required for Emergency proclamation, (iii) Parliamentary approval within 1 month by special majority (not simple majority), (iv) Emergency expires after 6 months unless renewed by Parliament, (v) Fundamental Rights under Articles 20-21 cannot be suspended even during Emergency, (vi) Judicial review of Emergency proclamation permitted, (b) NOT introduced: Automatic expiry after 3 months — Emergency expires after 6 months unless renewed, (c) Rationale: Prevent recurrence of 1975-77 Emergency misuse while preserving Union's ability to respond to genuine crises, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1978: No National Emergency proclaimed, reflecting effectiveness of safeguards, (ii) Judicial review: Courts can examine whether Emergency based on objective material, not political considerations, (e) Illustrates constitutional learning: 44th Amendment represents institutional learning from 1975 Emergency; safeguards balance crisis response capacity with prevention of political misuse.