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Answer: Any procedure prescribed by validly enacted statute, regardless of fairness
A.K. Gopalan (1950) narrow interpretation of Article 21: (a) Context: Challenge to preventive detention under Preventive Detention Act, 1950; issue whether detention procedure satisfies Article 21, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) 'Procedure established by law' in Article 21 means procedure prescribed by validly enacted statute, not 'due process of law' as in American Constitution, (ii) Courts cannot examine fairness, reasonableness of procedure; only whether procedure prescribed by law, (iii) Articles 19, 21 are mutually exclusive; law satisfying Article 21 need not satisfy Article 19, (c) Later overruling: (i) Maneka Gandhi (1978): Overruled Gopalan; held procedure under Article 21 must be 'fair, just, and reasonable', not arbitrary or oppressive, (ii) Golden triangle: Articles 14, 19, 21 form interconnected framework; laws affecting personal liberty must satisfy all three articles, (d) Applications: (i) Preventive detention: Post-Maneka Gandhi, preventive detention laws must include procedural safeguards (Article 22), judicial review, (ii) Rights expansion: Maneka Gandhi enabled expansion of Article 21 to include privacy, health, environment, livelihood, dignity, (e) Rationale for evolution: (i) Constitutional supremacy: Procedure must comply with constitutional values, not just statutory authorization, (ii) Rights protection: Fair procedure essential for enforcing Fundamental Rights against state excess, (iii) Democratic accountability: Ensures government accountable to Constitution, not arbitrary power, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: A.K. Gopalan represented formalist interpretation; Maneka Gandhi enabled substantive rights protection through procedural due process; Article 21 interpreted to impose positive obligations on State for fair procedure.
Answer: destroyed
Golak Nath (1967) Fundamental Rights and amendment power: (a) Context: Challenge to constitutional amendments affecting property rights (Articles 19(1)(f), 31); issue whether Parliament can amend Fundamental Rights, (b) Supreme Court holding (6:5): (i) Parliament cannot amend Fundamental Rights under Article 368; Fundamental Rights are 'transcendental and immutable', (ii) Article 368 only prescribes procedure for amendment, not substantive power to amend Fundamental Rights, (iii) Applied prospective overruling: Judgment applies only to future amendments, not past amendments affecting property rights, (c) Later modification: (i) Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Modified Golak Nath; held Parliament can amend any provision including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter 'basic structure' of Constitution, (ii) Balance: Fundamental Rights can be abridged but not destroyed if part of basic structure, (iii) Rationale: Enables constitutional adaptation while preserving core identity, (d) Applications: (i) Property rights: Golak Nath protected property rights; subsequent amendments (44th Amendment) removed property as Fundamental Right but retained constitutional protection, (ii) Basic structure: Kesavananda enabled balanced approach — amendments possible but core values protected, (e) Rationale for evolution: (i) Constitutional flexibility: Golak Nath's absolute bar on FR amendments too rigid; Kesavananda enabled adaptation while preserving core, (ii) Democratic legitimacy: Parliament needs flexibility to address contemporary challenges, but core values must be protected, (iii) Rights protection: Basic structure doctrine ensures Fundamental Rights forming part of core remain protected, (f) Illustrates constitutional evolution: Golak Nath represented strong rights protection; Kesavananda calibrated approach enables constitutional adaptation while preserving core identity; balance between flexibility, permanence essential to living constitutionalism.
Answer: True
Berubari Union (1960) Preamble interpretation: (a) Context: Dispute regarding transfer of Berubari territory to Pakistan under Indo-Pakistan Agreement; issue whether Preamble limits Parliament's treaty-making power, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Preamble is not part of Constitution; merely introductory statement of objectives, (ii) Preamble has no legal force; cannot limit Parliament's amending power or treaty-making authority, (iii) Constitutional provisions, not Preamble, determine scope of governmental powers, (c) Later developments: (i) Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Overruled Berubari; held Preamble is part of Constitution, amendable under Article 368 but basic structure unamendable, (ii) Interpretive role: Courts use Preamble to resolve ambiguities in statutes and constitutional provisions, (iii) Limiting role: Preamble values form part of basic structure; Parliament cannot amend Constitution to destroy these values, (d) Applications: (i) Puttaswamy: Preamble dignity guided privacy recognition, (ii) Navtej Singh Johar: Preamble equality guided LGBTQ+ rights protection, (iii) SR Bommai: Preamble secularism guided federalism interpretation, (e) Rationale for evolution: (i) Constitutional identity: Preamble contains substantive commitments (socialist, secular, fraternity) integral to constitutional identity, (ii) Comparative context: Indian Preamble more substantive than US Preamble (purely introductory), (iii) Democratic legitimacy: Preamble expresses popular sovereignty; values guide constitutional interpretation, (f) Illustrates living constitutionalism: Judicial understanding of Preamble evolved through democratic practice; Kesavananda recognized Preamble's normative significance for constitutional interpretation, basic structure doctrine.
Answer: Reasonable regulations ensuring educational standards, non-exploitation, while preserving minority character
T.M.A. Pai (2002) minority educational institutions: (a) Context: Challenge to State regulations on minority educational institutions regarding admissions, fees, administration, (b) Supreme Court holding (11-judge bench): (i) Religious/linguistic minorities have right to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30(1), (ii) State can impose reasonable regulations to: (a) Ensure educational standards, (b) Prevent maladministration, exploitation, (c) Promote national integration, (iii) BUT regulations cannot destroy minority character of institutions or interfere with core administrative autonomy, (c) Applications: (i) Admissions: Minority institutions can reserve seats for minority students; non-minority admissions subject to merit, State regulations, (ii) Fees: Institutions can charge reasonable fees; State can regulate to prevent profiteering, exploitation, (iii) Administration: Minority management autonomy in appointments, curriculum (within educational standards), (d) Rationale: (i) Minority protection: Article 30(1) enables minorities to conserve culture, language, identity through education, (ii) Educational standards: State interest in quality education, non-exploitation justifies reasonable regulation, (iii) Balance: Minority autonomy vs. public interest in education; reasonable regulations preserve both, (e) Illustrates calibrated federalism: Constitutional protection for minority institutions balanced with State regulatory authority; reasonable regulations ensure educational quality while preserving minority character.
Answer: objective
Rameshwar Prasad (2006) Governor's report and objective material: (a) Context: Bihar Assembly elections 2005 resulted in hung Assembly; Governor recommended President's Rule citing horse-trading based on media reports, without floor test, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Governor's satisfaction must be based on objective material, not unverified media reports or political considerations, (ii) Floor test is primary method to test majority; Governor cannot pre-empt Assembly's right to test majority, (iii) Dissolution of Assembly is extreme step; revival possible if proclamation invalidated, (c) SR Bommai reinforcement: (i) Presidential satisfaction subject to judicial review, (ii) Floor test as democratic standard for majority verification, (iii) Secularism part of basic structure; State action against secularism can justify Article 356, (iv) Assembly dissolution not automatic; can be revived if proclamation struck down, (d) Applications: (i) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Reiterated objective standards for Article 356 invocation, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (e) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (f) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Judicial review as guardian of federal balance; objective standards protect State autonomy within unified framework.
Answer: True
Prakash Singh (2006) police reforms and continuing mandamus: (a) Context: Petition regarding police accountability, independence, effectiveness; systemic issues in police functioning, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Issued binding directions for police reforms: (a) Fixed tenure for DGP, SPs to ensure operational independence, (b) Separation of investigation and law and order functions to improve investigation quality, (c) Police Complaint Authorities at State/district levels for accountability, (d) Police Establishment Boards for transfers, postings, (ii) Used continuing mandamus: Court kept petition pending, issued periodic directions to monitor implementation, (c) Applications: (i) State compliance: Some States implemented reforms through legislation, executive orders; others delayed, partial compliance, (ii) Judicial monitoring: Court periodically reviewed implementation status, issued further directions, (iii) Police accountability: Complaint authorities handle public grievances against police misconduct, (d) Rationale: (i) Rule of law: Police must function under law, not political pressure, (ii) Rights protection: Independent, accountable police essential for enforcing Fundamental Rights, (iii) Democratic governance: Police reforms strengthen democratic institutions, public trust, (e) Challenges: (i) Political will: Police reforms require State commitment; political interference remains challenge, (ii) Capacity: Training, resources needed for effective implementation, (iii) Monitoring: Ensuring compliance with Supreme Court directions requires sustained judicial, civil society engagement, (f) Illustrates innovative enforcement: Continuing mandamus enables courts to sustain engagement to realize constitutional values without overstepping institutional boundaries; police reforms operationalize rule of law, rights protection.
Answer: locus standi
S.P. Gupta (1981) PIL and locus standi: (a) Context: Petition regarding judicial appointments; broader issue of access to justice for marginalized groups, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Relaxed locus standi (personal injury requirement) for PIL cases, (ii) Any citizen/public-spirited organization can file petition for enforcement of rights of persons unable to approach court due to poverty, ignorance, or social disadvantage, (iii) Transformed judicial role: From dispute resolution to social justice delivery, (c) Applications: (i) Prison conditions: Hussainara Khatoon (undertrial release), Sunil Batra (prison reforms), (ii) Environmental protection: MC Mehta cases (Ganga pollution, vehicular emissions), (iii) Gender justice: Vishaka (workplace sexual harassment), (iv) Bonded labour: Bandhua Mukti Morcha (release, rehabilitation), (d) Safeguards: (i) Courts developed filters to prevent frivolous PILs; focus on genuine public interest, marginalized groups, (ii) Balance: Access to justice for marginalized vs preventing judicial overreach, (e) Rationale: (i) Substantive equality: Formal rights meaningful only with access to enforcement mechanisms, (ii) Democratic participation: PIL enables citizen engagement in governance, accountability, (iii) Social justice: Courts address systemic inequalities affecting marginalized groups, (f) Illustrates participatory constitutionalism: Rights realization requires active citizen engagement alongside institutional mechanisms; PIL bridges gap between legal recognition and practical realization of justice.
Answer: violence
Kedar Nath Singh (1962) sedition law limitations: (a) Context: Challenge to constitutionality of Section 124A IPC (sedition) as violating freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Upheld constitutionality of sedition law but read down its scope, (ii) Sedition applies only to acts inciting violence or public disorder, not mere criticism of government, (iii) Reasonable restriction: Sedition law valid under Article 19(2) as reasonable restriction for public order, security of State, (c) Applications: (i) Free speech protection: Legitimate criticism, dissent, protest protected; only incitement to violence punishable, (ii) National security: Genuine threats to sovereignty, integrity addressed through calibrated legal provisions, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts scrutinize charges to prevent misuse against political dissent, (d) Subsequent developments: (i) S.G. Vombatkere (2022): SC put on hold Section 124A pending government review; noted potential misuse against free speech, (ii) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (2024): Replaced sedition with narrower provision requiring intent/tendency to incite violence or public disorder, (e) Rationale: (i) Democratic discourse: Criticism of government essential for accountability, democratic participation, (ii) Public order: Incitement to violence threatens social harmony, security, (iii) Proportionality: Restrictions on speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate aim, (f) Illustrates calibrated rights balancing: Freedom of speech essential for democracy; proportionality ensures sedition restrictions justified, not arbitrary, preserving democratic discourse while protecting public order.
Answer: True
Waman Rao (1981) prospective overruling: (a) Context: Challenge to constitutional amendments placed in Ninth Schedule (immune from judicial review) enacted before/after Kesavananda judgment (April 24, 1973), (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Applied prospective overruling: Basic structure doctrine applies only to amendments enacted after April 24, 1973 (date of Kesavananda judgment), (ii) Pre-1973 amendments: Immune from basic structure challenge to ensure legal certainty, avoid chaos from invalidating long-standing laws, (iii) Post-1973 amendments: Subject to basic structure review; can be struck down if violating core constitutional features, (c) Applications: (i) Ninth Schedule laws: Pre-1973 laws in Ninth Schedule protected; post-1973 laws subject to basic structure review (I.R. Coelho case, 2007), (ii) Legal certainty: Prospective overruling balances constitutional supremacy with stability of enacted laws, (iii) Judicial restraint: Courts respect parliamentary sovereignty for pre-Kesavananda amendments while asserting review power for subsequent amendments, (d) Rationale: (i) Avoid retrospective invalidation: Prevents disruption of laws relied upon by citizens, government for decades, (ii) Constitutional evolution: Basic structure doctrine applies prospectively to guide future amendments, not rewrite past, (iii) Balance: Preserves legal certainty while ensuring future amendments respect core constitutional identity, (e) Illustrates calibrated judicial review: Prospective overruling enables basic structure doctrine to guide constitutional evolution without destabilizing settled legal landscape; balances constitutional supremacy with rule of law values.
Answer: Decisions of tribunals established under Articles 323A/323B are subject to judicial review by High Courts/Supreme Court; ouster clauses cannot exclude constitutional courts' jurisdiction
L. Chandra Kumar (1997) tribunal jurisdiction and judicial review: (a) Context: Challenge to administrative tribunals established under Articles 323A (Central Administrative Tribunal), 323B (State tribunals) with ouster clauses excluding High Court jurisdiction, (b) Supreme Court holding (7-judge bench): (i) Tribunals' decisions subject to judicial review by High Courts under Article 226/227 and Supreme Court under Article 32, (ii) Ouster clauses cannot exclude constitutional courts' jurisdiction; judicial review part of basic structure, (iii) Tribunals serve as first appellate forum; High Courts exercise supervisory jurisdiction, not routine appellate review, (c) Applications: (i) Tribunal decisions: Subject to HC/SC review for jurisdictional errors, violation of natural justice, constitutional principles, (ii) Ouster clauses: Cannot completely exclude judicial review; courts retain power to examine constitutional compliance, (iii) Separation of powers: Tribunals handle specialized disputes; constitutional courts ensure constitutional supremacy, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional supremacy: Judicial review ensures Constitution, not transient majorities, supreme, (ii) Rights protection: Judicial review essential for enforcing Fundamental Rights against state excess, (iii) Accountability: Ensures government accountable to Constitution, not arbitrary power, (e) Illustrates basic structure protection: Judicial review as unamendable core; amendment power cannot destroy mechanism ensuring constitutional compliance, rights protection, governmental accountability.
Answer: True
MC Mehta cases environmental jurisprudence: (a) Context: Series of public interest litigations by environmental lawyer MC Mehta addressing pollution, industrial hazards, environmental degradation, (b) Key holdings: (i) Absolute liability (Oleum Gas Leak case, 1987): Enterprises engaged in hazardous activities liable for harm regardless of negligence; no defenses available, (ii) Public trust doctrine: State as trustee of natural resources (rivers, forests, air) for present and future generations, (iii) Sustainable development: Balance development needs with ecological sustainability; precautionary principle, polluter pays principle as part of environmental law, (c) Constitutional basis: Article 21 (right to life includes healthy environment) + Article 48A (DPSP: State to protect environment) + Article 51A(g) (Fundamental Duty: protect environment), (d) Applications: (i) Industrial regulation: Closure of polluting units, emission standards, environmental impact assessments, (ii) River protection: Ganga, Yamuna cleaning efforts, restrictions on industrial discharge, (iii) Climate litigation: Emerging cases challenging coal projects, emission norms based on right to healthy environment, (e) Institutional mechanisms: (i) National Green Tribunal (NGT): Expedited environmental dispute resolution, (ii) Pollution Control Boards: Monitoring, enforcement of standards, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to impose positive obligations on State, industries for environmental protection; absolute liability ensures accountability for hazardous activities.
Answer: True
Supriyo (2023) same-sex marriage case: (a) Context: Petitions seeking legal recognition of same-sex marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954, (b) Supreme Court holding (5-judge Constitution Bench, 3:2 on key issues): (i) No fundamental right to marry under Constitution (though marriage protected under personal laws), (ii) Recognition of same-sex marriage involves complex policy considerations (adoption, succession, maintenance, social welfare) best left to Parliament, (iii) However, affirmed rights of queer couples: protection from discrimination, right to cohabit, access to services without discrimination, (iv) Directed government to form committee to examine rights/entitlements of queer couples, (c) Applications: (i) Legislative follow-up: Ongoing debate on civil unions, marriage equality, anti-discrimination law, (ii) Rights protection: Courts continue to protect queer rights through existing constitutional provisions (Articles 14, 15, 19, 21), (iii) Institutional reform: Directions for sensitization of police, judiciary, healthcare providers, (d) Rationale: (i) Separation of powers: Courts recognize limits of judicial expertise in complex policy design but assert role in protecting constitutional values, (ii) Democratic legitimacy: Marriage recognition requires broad social consensus, legislative deliberation, not judicial fiat, (iii) Rights protection: Affirms core rights (non-discrimination, dignity) while deferring complex policy questions to legislature, (e) Illustrates calibrated judicial philosophy: Judicial restraint in policy domain, activism in rights protection; balance between constitutional values and democratic legitimacy.
Answer: 21
Common Cause (2018) right to die with dignity: (a) Context: Petition seeking recognition of passive euthanasia, living wills for terminally ill patients in persistent vegetative state, (b) Supreme Court holding (5-judge bench): (i) Right to die with dignity part of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), (ii) Passive euthanasia (withdrawing life support) permissible for terminally ill patients in persistent vegetative state, (iii) Living will valid subject to safeguards: medical board certification, judicial oversight, etc., (c) Safeguards imposed: (i) Medical board certification: Multiple doctors confirm terminal illness/vegetative state, (ii) Judicial oversight: Magistrate approval for implementing living will, (iii) Hospital ethics committee: Periodic review of decision, (iv) Patient autonomy: Living will reflects patient's prior informed consent; family consent not mandatory if living will valid, (d) Limits: (i) Active euthanasia/assisted suicide remains illegal; only passive withdrawal of life support permitted, (ii) Procedural safeguards prevent misuse, ensure genuine patient autonomy, (e) Applications: (i) End-of-life care: Hospitals develop protocols for passive euthanasia, living will registration, (ii) Legal awareness: Public education about advance medical directives, rights, procedures, (iii) Ethical guidelines: Medical councils issue guidance on end-of-life decisions, (f) Illustrates calibrated rights balancing: Individual autonomy (right to die with dignity) balanced with sanctity of life, prevention of abuse through procedural safeguards.
Answer: True
NALSA (2014) transgender rights: (a) Context: Petition seeking legal recognition, rights protection for transgender persons facing discrimination, violence, exclusion, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Recognized transgender persons as 'third gender' under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, (ii) Affirmed right to self-identify gender without medical/surgical intervention, (iii) Directed: (a) Reservation in education/employment, (b) Separate facilities in public spaces, (c) Legal recognition of gender identity, (c) Applications: (i) Led to Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 (with criticisms on certificate requirement), (ii) Foundation for gender justice jurisprudence: Navtej Singh Johar (LGBTQ+ rights), Shayara Bano (gender justice in personal law), (iii) Institutional mechanisms: National/State Transgender Welfare Boards for policy, monitoring, (d) Rationale: (i) Dignity: Gender identity intrinsic to personality; discrimination violates dignity, autonomy, privacy under Article 21, (ii) Equality: Discrimination based on gender identity violates Articles 14 (arbitrary classification), 15 (discrimination based on sex — interpreted to include gender identity), (iii) Liberty: Right to express gender identity protected under Article 19(1)(a), (e) Challenges: (i) Implementation: Awareness, capacity for inclusive policies, grievance redressal, (ii) Social acceptance: Legal recognition requires accompanying social education, community engagement, (iii) Intersectionality: Transgender persons face compounded discrimination (caste, class, disability); policies need intersectional approach, (f) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to protect gender identity, dignity; affirmative action addresses historical discrimination against transgender persons.
Answer: Right to move courts for enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 is suspended during Emergency, but this judgment was later overruled by Puttaswamy (2017)
ADM Jabalpur (1976) habeas corpus during Emergency: (a) Context: During 1975-77 Emergency, Presidential order under Article 359 suspended enforcement of Fundamental Rights including Article 21; detainees challenged detention through habeas corpus petitions, (b) Supreme Court holding (4:1): (i) Right to move courts for enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Article 21 suspended during Emergency when Presidential order issued under Article 359, (ii) Detainees cannot challenge detention on grounds of violation of Article 21 during Emergency, (iii) Dissent by Justice H.R. Khanna: Argued right to life/liberty cannot be suspended even during Emergency, (c) Later developments: (i) 44th Amendment (1978): Made Articles 20-21 non-suspendable during Emergency, preventing recurrence, (ii) Puttaswamy (2017): Overruled ADM Jabalpur, held right to privacy (part of Article 21) cannot be suspended, reinforcing dignity as foundational value, (d) Applications: (i) Emergency safeguards: Post-1978, Articles 20-21 protected even during Emergency, (ii) Rights protection: Puttaswamy reinforced that core rights cannot be suspended, aligning with basic structure doctrine, (e) Illustrates constitutional learning: ADM Jabalpur represented low point in rights protection; subsequent amendments, judgments strengthened safeguards against Emergency misuse, demonstrating constitutional evolution through democratic practice.
Answer: creamy
Indra Sawhney (1992) creamy layer concept: (a) Context: Challenge to Mandal Commission recommendations implementing 27% OBC reservation in government jobs, (b) Supreme Court holding (9-judge bench): (i) Upheld 27% OBC reservation applying reasonable classification test under Article 14, (ii) Introduced 'creamy layer' exclusion: Advanced sections within OBCs (based on income, occupation, education) excluded from reservation benefits, (iii) 50% ceiling on total reservation (with exceptions for extraordinary situations), (c) Applications: (i) OBC reservation: Creamy layer exclusion applied to education, employment reservations, (ii) Subsequent extension: Jarnail Singh (2018) applied creamy layer to SC/ST promotions, though Davinder Singh (2024) focused on sub-classification, (iii) State implementation: States maintain creamy layer lists, update income criteria, verify applications, (d) Rationale: (i) Substantive equality: Ensure benefits reach neediest within OBCs; advanced sections excluded to prevent reverse discrimination, (ii) Proportionality: Balances affirmative action with merit; 50% ceiling balances equality goals with efficiency, (iii) Empirical basis: Classification based on social, educational, economic indicators, not presumption, (e) Illustrates calibrated affirmative action: Reasonable classification enables substantive equality while preventing overbreadth; empirical basis ensures reservations achieve transformative justice without undermining merit.
Answer: True
Vishaka (1997) gender justice and judicial activism: (a) Context: Sexual harassment of social worker in Rajasthan; no specific legislation on workplace sexual harassment at that time, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Laid down binding guidelines (Vishaka Guidelines) to prevent sexual harassment at workplace, (ii) Guidelines based on CEDAW (international convention), Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, (iii) Key measures: Complaint committees, prevention mechanisms, victim protection, employer liability, (c) Applications: (i) Operationalized until Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, (ii) Foundation for gender justice jurisprudence: Shayara Bano (triple talaq), Joseph Shine (adultery), Navtej Singh Johar (LGBTQ+ rights), (iii) Illustrates judicial role: Courts can issue guidelines when legislative vacuum violates fundamental rights; temporary measure until Parliament legislates, (d) Rationale: (i) Rights protection: Judicial activism essential when legislature fails to protect fundamental rights, (ii) Separation of powers: Guidelines respect legislative domain; Parliament later enacted comprehensive law, (iii) International law: CEDAW obligations inform constitutional interpretation, (e) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Using constitutional values to advance gender justice; judicial activism as tool for social transformation when legislative action delayed.
Answer: Fair, just, and reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive
Maneka Gandhi (1978) procedural due process: (a) Context: Challenge to impounding of passport under Passport Act without hearing, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Overruled A.K. Gopalan (1950) narrow interpretation of Article 21, (ii) Procedure under Article 21 must be 'fair, just, and reasonable', not arbitrary or oppressive — importing procedural due process from American constitutional law, (iii) Articles 14, 19, 21 form a golden triangle; laws affecting personal liberty must satisfy all three articles, (c) Applications: (i) Enabled judicial review of executive action affecting life/liberty, (ii) Foundation for expanding Article 21 to include privacy, health, environment, livelihood, dignity, (iii) Procedural safeguards: Notice, hearing, reasoned order, appeal mechanism required for actions affecting rights, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional supremacy: Procedure must comply with constitutional values, not just statutory authorization, (ii) Rights protection: Fair procedure essential for enforcing Fundamental Rights against state excess, (iii) Accountability: Ensures government accountable to Constitution, not arbitrary power, (e) Illustrates transformative constitutionalism: Article 21 interpreted to impose positive obligations on State for procedural fairness; foundation for rights expansion through judicial interpretation.
Answer: basic structure
I.R. Coelho (2007) Ninth Schedule review: (a) Context: Challenge to laws placed in Ninth Schedule (immune from judicial review under Article 31B) after Kesavananda judgment; petitioners argued such laws can violate fundamental rights, (b) Supreme Court holding (9-judge bench): (i) Laws placed in Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 subject to basic structure review, (ii) If such laws violate fundamental rights forming part of basic structure (e.g., Articles 14, 19, 21), they can be struck down despite Ninth Schedule protection, (iii) Test: Whether law damages/destroys basic structure features (democracy, secularism, equality, etc.), (c) Applications: (i) Post-1973 Ninth Schedule laws: Subject to judicial scrutiny for basic structure compliance, (ii) Fundamental rights as basic structure: Articles 14 (equality), 19 (freedoms), 21 (life/liberty) form part of basic structure; laws violating these core rights can be invalidated, (iii) Balancing test: Courts examine whether law's object, impact destroys basic structure features, (d) Rationale: (i) Prevent constitutional bypass: Ninth Schedule cannot be used to enact laws violating core constitutional values, (ii) Basic structure supremacy: No constitutional provision (including Article 31B) can override basic structure doctrine, (iii) Rights protection: Ensures fundamental rights forming part of basic structure remain protected against legislative excess, (e) Illustrates basic structure enforcement: Ninth Schedule immunity not absolute; post-Kesavananda laws subject to basic structure review, ensuring constitutional core values protected against legislative attempts to bypass judicial review.
Answer: True
NJAC judgment (2015) judicial independence: (a) Context: 99th Amendment (2014) established National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) with executive role in judicial appointments; challenged as violating basic structure, (b) Supreme Court holding (4:1): (i) Judicial independence part of basic structure; primacy of judiciary in appointments essential for separation of powers, (ii) NJAC's executive role threatens judicial independence; violates basic structure, (iii) Collegium system (CJI + senior judges) reinstated as mechanism preserving judicial independence, (c) Applications: (i) Judicial appointments: Collegium continues to recommend names; President normally appoints based on recommendations, (ii) Reform debate: Ongoing discussion on improving collegium transparency, efficiency while preserving independence, (iii) Separation of powers: Judgment reinforces judiciary's role in checking executive/legislative excess, (d) Rationale: (i) Judicial independence essential for constitutional review, rights protection, (ii) Executive role in appointments risks political interference, undermining impartiality, (iii) Collegium, despite flaws, better preserves independence than NJAC framework, (e) Illustrates basic structure protection: Judicial independence as unamendable core; amendment power cannot destroy separation of powers essential to constitutional democracy.