Polity – Hard Level – GK Questions

Basic structure limitations on Emergency powers: (a) Kesavananda Bharati (1973): Basic structure includes supremacy of Constitution, republican/democratic form, secularism, federalism, judicial review, rule of law, (b) SR Bommai (1994): Federalism part of basic structure; President's Rule cannot be used to abolish States or destroy federal balance permanently, (c) Implications: (i) Emergency provisions temporary; cannot amend Constitution to make Emergency permanent, (ii) Core democratic features (elections, legislative functioning) must be restored post-Emergency, (iii) Judicial review ensures Emergency not used to subvert basic structure, (d) Balance: Constitution enables crisis response through Emergency powers but protects foundational values through basic structure doctrine. Illustrates constitutional resilience: flexible enough for crisis management, rigid enough to preserve democratic identity.

Financial Emergency salary provisions: (a) Article 360(4)(b): President may issue directions for reduction of salaries of: (i) All persons serving Union (including Supreme Court Judges), (ii) All persons serving State (including High Court Judges), (b) Rationale: During financial crisis, all state functionaries share burden; judicial independence protected by other safeguards (security of tenure, removal procedure), (c) Historical note: Never invoked; reflects high threshold and political consensus against using this provision, (d) Balance: Fiscal discipline during crisis vs. institutional independence; Constitution assumes crisis temporary, safeguards permanent. Illustrates nuanced federal-fiscal design: Union power to address national financial crisis while respecting institutional autonomy through procedural protections.

Rameshwar Prasad case (2006): Facts and holding: (a) Bihar Assembly elections 2005 resulted in hung Assembly; Governor recommended President's Rule citing horse-trading based on media reports, without floor test, (b) SC held: (i) Governor's satisfaction must be based on objective material, not unverified media reports or political considerations, (ii) Floor test is primary method to test majority; Governor cannot pre-empt Assembly's right to test majority, (iii) Dissolution of Assembly is extreme step; revival possible if proclamation invalidated, (c) Impact: Reinforced SR Bommai principles; curbed arbitrary use of Article 356 for political ends, (d) Federal significance: Protected State autonomy against Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion. Illustrates judicial protection of federal balance: objective standards for Emergency proclamation.

Pandemic management without Constitutional Emergency: (a) Legal framework: Disaster Management Act, 2005 empowered National/State Disaster Management Authorities to issue guidelines, (b) Executive actions: (i) Lockdown orders under Section 144 CrPC, Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, (ii) Migrant welfare measures under existing labour laws, (iii) Economic relief through fiscal packages under Finance Act provisions, (c) Constitutional considerations: (i) High threshold for Article 352 ('armed rebellion') not met by health crisis, (ii) Federal cooperation preferred over unitary control, (iii) Judicial review ensured rights protection (e.g., migrant rights cases), (d) Lessons: Existing legal frameworks sufficient for non-existential crises; Constitutional Emergency reserved for war/external aggression/armed rebellion. Illustrates adaptive governance: using ordinary laws for extraordinary situations while preserving constitutional safeguards.

FR suspension mechanisms: (a) Article 358: Automatic suspension of Article 19 freedoms (speech, assembly, etc.) only when Emergency proclaimed on war/external aggression grounds (not armed rebellion); suspension lasts for Emergency duration; laws made during suspension remain valid even after Article 19 revival, (b) Article 359: Requires separate Presidential order to suspend enforcement of specified FRs (except Articles 20-21 after 44th Amendment); order must specify rights and territory; subject to Parliamentary approval, (c) Distinction: Article 358 is automatic and limited to Article 19; Article 359 is discretionary and can cover multiple FRs, (d) Safeguards: 44th Amendment made Articles 20-21 non-suspendable under Article 359. Illustrates nuanced rights balancing: some freedoms automatically restricted during existential threats; core rights always protected.

Judicial review of Emergency proclamations: (a) Traditional view: Presidential satisfaction subjective, non-justiciable, (b) Evolution: (i) SR Bommai (1994): President's Rule satisfaction subject to judicial review; courts can examine if based on objective material, if mala fide, if violates basic structure, (ii) Subsequent cases: National Emergency satisfaction also reviewable for constitutional compliance, (c) Scope of review: Courts don't substitute wisdom for executive; check for: (i) Relevant material, (ii) Constitutional standards, (iii) Procedural compliance, (iv) Basic structure violations, (d) Limits: Courts generally defer to executive on threat assessment but ensure constitutional boundaries respected. Illustrates calibrated judicial oversight: respecting executive domain while protecting constitutional supremacy and federal balance.

44th Amendment safeguards (1978): (a) National Emergency: (i) 'Armed rebellion' replaces 'internal disturbance' (higher threshold), (ii) Written Cabinet advice mandatory (not just PM), (iii) Parliamentary approval within 1 month by special majority, (iv) Articles 20-21 non-suspendable, (v) Lok Sabha can revoke by simple majority, (b) President's Rule: (i) Governor's report must be based on objective material, (ii) Subject to judicial review (later reinforced by SR Bommai), (iii) Maximum duration 3 years with strict conditions for extension, (c) Financial Emergency: Written Cabinet advice mandatory; simple majority for Parliamentary approval. Option (d) is incorrect: 44th Amendment strengthened, not weakened, safeguards against arbitrary President's Rule. Illustrates constitutional learning: post-1975 reforms to prevent Emergency misuse.

SR Bommai guidelines (1994): (a) Presidential satisfaction under Article 356 subject to judicial review, (b) Floor test primary method to test majority; Governor cannot dismiss Ministry without testing majority on Assembly floor, (c) Secularism part of basic structure; State government acting against secularism can justify Article 356, (d) Assembly dissolution not automatic; can be revived if proclamation struck down, (e) Governor's report based on objective material, not political opinion, (f) Proclamation must be approved by Parliament within 2 months; if not, State government reinstated. Landmark judgment curbing arbitrary use of Article 356; strengthened federal balance by protecting State autonomy against political misuse.

Non-suspendable rights (44th Amendment, 1978): (a) Article 20: Protection in respect of conviction for offences - (i) No ex post facto law, (ii) No double jeopardy, (iii) No self-incrimination, (b) Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty - right to fair procedure, dignity, privacy, (c) Rationale: These core rights essential even during crisis; prevent executive excesses like arbitrary detention, torture, retrospective punishment, (d) Article 19 freedoms: Automatically suspended during Emergency on war/external aggression grounds (Article 358), but not during armed rebellion, (e) Historical context: 1975-77 Emergency saw widespread rights violations; 44th Amendment strengthened safeguards. Illustrates constitutional learning: balancing crisis response with rights protection.

Emergency federalism transformation: (a) Article 250: During National Emergency, Parliament gains power to legislate on any State List subject; laws made cease to operate 6 months after Emergency ends (except things done/omitted before expiry), (b) Article 353(b): Union executive can give directions to States on 'manner of exercise' of executive power, (c) Article 354: President can modify financial distribution between Union and States during Emergency, (d) Rationale: Ensure coordinated national response to existential threats (war, external aggression, armed rebellion), (e) Safeguards: Temporary nature, Parliamentary approval, judicial review, restoration of federal normalcy post-Emergency. Illustrates Indian federalism's flexibility: unitary features for crisis management within constitutional framework.

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980): SC struck down parts of 42nd Amendment that sought to exclude judicial review of constitutional amendments. Held: judicial review is part of basic structure; Parliament cannot destroy it. Reinforced Kesavananda Bharati (1973) doctrine: amending power is limited, not absolute.

Article 136: SC may grant special leave to appeal from any court/tribunal in India, EXCEPT courts-martial. This discretionary appellate power is residuary and plenary, enabling SC to correct grave injustices or settle important legal questions. Most SLPs are dismissed at threshold; only meritorious cases admitted.

PIL evolved through judicial activism in 1980s (S.P. Gupta case, 1981): SC relaxed locus standi, allowing any public-spirited person to file petitions for enforcement of rights of disadvantaged groups. Not created by constitutional amendment but by expansive interpretation of Article 32. Democratized access to justice.

Article 227: HC has superintendence over all courts/tribunals within its territory, but NOT over courts-martial (military courts) or tribunals constituted under laws relating to armed forces. This exception preserves military justice system's autonomy while ensuring civilian judicial oversight over regular courts.

Article 137: SC may review its own judgments/orders to correct errors apparent on record. Review petitions must be filed within 30 days. Article 145 empowers SC to make rules for regulating practice/procedure, including review procedure. Review is not appeal; only for glaring errors, not re-argument of case.

Article 222: President may transfer HC Judges after consultation with CJI. Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta (1981) and subsequent cases held that CJI's opinion has primacy in transfers to ensure independence and prevent punitive transfers. Transferred Judge receives compensatory allowance. Promotes national integration and judicial exposure.

Judicial review is not explicitly mentioned but is inherent power derived from: (a) Article 13 (laws inconsistent with FRs void), (b) Article 32/226 (writ jurisdiction), (c) Article 131-136 (SC jurisdiction), (d) basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973). Enables courts to examine constitutionality of laws/executive actions.

Article 124(4): SC Judges can be removed only by Presidential order after Parliament passes address by: (a) majority of total membership of each House, AND (b) 2/3 of members present and voting. Grounds: proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 outlines procedure. Only one removal motion initiated (Justice Ramaswami, 1993) but failed.

Article 163(1): Council of Ministers with CM at head aids and advises Governor in exercise of functions, except where Governor is required to act in discretion. Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh (1974) affirmed that Governor generally acts on Cabinet advice. Other options are incorrect: Governor cannot arbitrarily dismiss CM; CM advises on AG appointment; Governor's ordinances are subject to judicial review.

Article 201: When Governor reserves Bill for President, President may: (a) assent, (b) withhold assent, or (c) direct Governor to return Bill to State Legislature (if not Money Bill) for reconsideration. If Legislature repasses Bill, Governor must present it again to President, who is not bound to assent.