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In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that Governor's report recommending President's Rule cannot be based on political considerations, party affiliations, or subjective assessments, but must be based on objective material of constitutional breakdown.
- True
- False
Answer: True
Objective material requirement under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition based on political considerations, not genuine constitutional breakdown, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Governor's report must be based on objective material of constitutional breakdown (e.g., loss of majority verified through floor test, breakdown of law and order), (ii) Cannot be based on: Political considerations, party affiliations, subjective assessments, unverified media reports, (iii) Judicial review: Courts can examine whether report based on objective material, not political considerations, (c) Applications: (i) Rameshwar Prasad (2006): Struck down Bihar Assembly dissolution based on unverified media reports, political considerations, (ii) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Reiterated objective standards, struck down politically motivated Article 356 invocations, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected State governments represent people's will; Article 356 exceptional measure, not routine political tool, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Objective material requirement protects State autonomy; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political convenience.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the federal structure of the Constitution:
- Is permanently converted to unitary system
- Temporarily acquires unitary features but reverts to federal structure post-Emergency
- Is suspended entirely until Emergency ceases
- Is replaced by military administration
Answer: Temporarily acquires unitary features but reverts to federal structure post-Emergency
Federalism during Emergency: (a) Constitutional design: Indian federalism has unitary bias; Emergency provisions enable temporary unitary features for crisis management, (b) Temporary unitary features during Emergency: (i) Legislative: Parliament can legislate on State List (Article 250), (ii) Executive: Union can give directions to States on manner of executive power exercise (Article 353), (iii) Financial: President can modify revenue distribution (Article 354), (c) Post-Emergency restoration: (i) Parliament's laws on State List cease after 6 months, (ii) State executive resumes full autonomy, (iii) Federal fiscal normalcy restored, (d) Rationale: Ensure unified national response to existential threats while preserving federal structure for post-crisis governance, (e) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Temporary unitary features for defence coordination, post-Emergency federal normalcy restored, (ii) Federal balance: Emergency powers enable crisis response without permanent centralization, (f) Illustrates adaptive federalism: Temporary unitary features for crisis management within constitutional framework; balance between national security and State autonomy through time limits, sunset provisions.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that if a proclamation under Article 356 is struck down by courts, the State Assembly can be revived with the ______ restored, protecting democratic mandate against arbitrary deprivation.
- Governor
- Ministry
- Administrator
- President
Answer: Ministry
SR Bommai Ministry revival safeguard: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule with Assembly dissolution in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) If proclamation under Article 356 struck down by court, State Assembly can be revived with Ministry restored, (ii) Dissolution not automatic; extreme step requiring genuine justification, (iii) Floor test primary method to test majority before dissolution considered, (c) Rationale: (i) Democratic mandate: Elected Assembly represents people's will; revival protects democratic mandate against arbitrary deprivation, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach, (iii) Constitutional morality: Governor, President act as constitutional functionaries, not political agents, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to revive Assemblies if proclamation invalidated, (ii) Political accountability: Governments must justify dissolution with objective material, not political convenience, (e) Illustrates democratic federalism: Ministry revival safeguard ensures State executive autonomy protected; judicial review prevents arbitrary deprivation of democratic mandate.
Post-44th Amendment, courts can examine whether Presidential orders suspending Fundamental Rights under Article 359 during Emergency comply with constitutional limits, including non-suspension of Articles 20-21.
- True
- False
Answer: True
Judicial review of rights suspension during Emergency: (a) Pre-44th Amendment: Limited judicial review of Presidential orders suspending rights under Article 359, (b) Post-44th Amendment safeguards (1978): (i) Articles 20-21 cannot be suspended even during Emergency, (ii) Courts can examine whether Presidential orders comply with constitutional limits, including non-suspension of Articles 20-21, (iii) Judicial review scope: Procedural compliance, relevance to Emergency purposes, constitutional principles compliance, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1978: Courts more willing to strike down Presidential orders suspending non-suspendable rights, (ii) Rights protection: Ensures core rights (Articles 20-21) protected even during Emergency, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional supremacy: Presidential orders subject to constitutional limits, judicial oversight, (ii) Rights protection: Core rights essential for human dignity, rule of law, even during crisis, (iii) Democratic accountability: Courts ensure Emergency powers used for genuine crisis response, not rights suppression, (e) Illustrates calibrated rights protection: Enabling crisis response while preserving core rights; judicial review ensures Emergency powers comply with constitutional limits, not arbitrary rights suppression.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that Governor's report recommending President's Rule must be based on floor test results where possible. What is the primary rationale for this requirement?
- To expedite dismissal of State governments
- To ensure democratic verification of loss of majority through elected representatives
- To enhance Governor's discretionary powers
- To reduce judicial review scope
Answer: To ensure democratic verification of loss of majority through elected representatives
Floor test rationale under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition without floor test in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Floor test primary method to verify whether Ministry enjoys majority support in Assembly, (ii) Governor cannot dismiss Ministry based on subjective assessment, media reports, political considerations without floor test, (iii) Floor test ensures democratic verification: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (c) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected Assembly represents people's will; floor test ensures Ministry reflects Assembly majority, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down Article 356 proclamations without floor test, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Floor test as democratic standard ensures State governments reflect Assembly majority; judicial review protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach.
Before SR Bommai (1994), Article 356 was frequently used for political purposes (over 100 times), but post-SR Bommai safeguards have significantly reduced political misuse by requiring objective material, floor test, and judicial review.
- True
- False
Answer: True
Article 356 political misuse and SR Bommai impact: (a) Pre-SR Bommai era: Article 356 used over 100 times, often for political purposes (dismissing opposition State governments), (b) SR Bommai safeguards (1994): (i) Objective material requirement: Governor's report must be based on verified facts, not subjective opinion, (ii) Floor test principle: Majority tested on Assembly floor, not Governor's assessment, (iii) Judicial review: Courts can examine whether proclamation based on objective material, not political considerations, (iv) Assembly revival: If proclamation struck down, Assembly can be revived with Ministry restored, (c) Post-SR Bommai impact: (i) Reduced political misuse: Governments more cautious in recommending President's Rule; courts more willing to strike down politically motivated proclamations, (ii) Federal balance: Strengthened State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach, (iii) Democratic legitimacy: Enhanced public trust in federal governance, (d) Applications: (i) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Courts reiterate SR Bommai principles, strike down politically motivated Article 356 invocations, (ii) Political accountability: Governments must justify Article 356 with objective material, not political convenience, (e) Illustrates constitutional learning: SR Bommai represents institutional learning from political misuse of Article 356; safeguards balance Union's duty to preserve constitutional order with State autonomy, democratic mandate.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the powers of State Legislature:
- Are completely abolished and taken over by Parliament
- Continue to exist but Parliament can legislate on State List subjects under Article 250
- Are suspended until Emergency ceases
- Are transferred to Governor permanently
Answer: Continue to exist but Parliament can legislate on State List subjects under Article 250
State Legislature during Emergency: (a) Article 250: During Emergency, Parliament can legislate on any matter in State List, (b) State Legislature continuity: (i) State Legislature not abolished; continues to function, (ii) Parliament's concurrent power: Parliament can legislate on State List subjects for coordinated crisis response, (iii) Conflict resolution: Union law prevails in case of conflict with State law (Article 254), (iv) Post-Emergency: Parliament's laws on State List cease after 6 months; State Legislature resumes exclusive power, (c) Rationale: Enable unified national response to existential threats while preserving State legislative domain post-crisis, (d) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Parliament legislated on defence, security matters affecting States, (ii) Post-Emergency: Parliament's laws ceased after 6 months; State legislative autonomy restored, (e) Illustrates adaptive federalism: Temporary enhancement of Union legislative power for crisis management, reversible post-Emergency to restore State autonomy; balance between national security and federal autonomy.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court emphasized that floor test to verify majority should be conducted ______ to ensure democratic verification before considering Article 356 imposition.
- after dismissal of Ministry
- before dismissal of Ministry
- only after Presidential approval
- only during Emergency
Answer: before dismissal of Ministry
Floor test timing under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition without floor test in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Floor test should be conducted before dismissal of Ministry to verify whether Ministry enjoys majority support, (ii) Governor cannot dismiss Ministry based on subjective assessment, media reports, political considerations without floor test, (iii) Floor test ensures democratic verification: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (c) Applications: (i) Hung Assembly scenarios: Governor must invite leader most likely to command majority, verify through floor test before considering Article 356, (ii) Judicial review: Courts can examine whether floor test conducted fairly, results respected, before upholding Article 356, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected Assembly represents people's will; floor test ensures Ministry reflects Assembly majority, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Floor test before dismissal ensures State governments reflect Assembly majority; judicial review protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach.
The Supreme Court has held that even during a National Emergency under Article 352, the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be destroyed, meaning amendments or actions during Emergency cannot alter core features like democracy, secularism, federalism, judicial review.
- True
- False
Answer: True
Emergency and basic structure doctrine: (a) Constitutional principle: Basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973) holds that Parliament cannot amend Constitution to destroy core features (democracy, secularism, federalism, judicial review, rule of law, dignity), (b) Application to Emergency: (i) Even during Emergency, basic structure cannot be destroyed; Emergency powers subject to basic structure limits, (ii) Actions during Emergency (legislation, executive orders) cannot alter core constitutional features, (iii) Judicial review: Courts can examine whether Emergency actions comply with basic structure, not just procedural compliance, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1978: Emergency actions subject to basic structure review; courts strike down actions violating core features, (ii) Federal balance: Ensures Emergency powers used for genuine crisis response, not destruction of constitutional identity, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional supremacy: Basic structure preserves constitutional identity against transient majorities, even during crisis, (ii) Rights protection: Core features essential for rights protection, democratic governance, even during Emergency, (iii) Democratic legitimacy: Emergency powers enable crisis response but cannot alter foundational constitutional values, (e) Illustrates constitutional resilience: Basic structure doctrine ensures Constitution's core identity preserved even during crisis; balance between crisis response capacity and preservation of constitutional democracy.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court emphasized that 'breakdown of constitutional machinery' under Article 356 refers to:
- Political instability or change of government through democratic process
- Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution
- Disagreement between State and Union on policy matters
- Electoral defeat of ruling party in State
Answer: Genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution
Constitutional breakdown definition under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition based on political instability, not genuine constitutional breakdown, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) 'Breakdown of constitutional machinery' means genuine inability of State government to function in accordance with Constitution, not mere political instability, (ii) Examples: Loss of majority verified through floor test, breakdown of law and order beyond State control, action against constitutional principles (secularism, democracy), (iii) NOT examples: Political instability, change of government through democratic process, policy disagreement with Union, electoral defeat, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down Article 356 proclamations based on political instability, not genuine constitutional breakdown, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected State governments represent people's will; Article 356 exceptional measure, not routine tool, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor, President act as constitutional functionaries, not political agents, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: 'Breakdown of constitutional machinery' narrowly defined to protect State autonomy; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine crises, not political convenience.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule is not final and can be examined by courts for objective material, procedural compliance, and constitutional principles compliance.
- True
- False
Answer: True
Judicial review of Governor's report: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition based on Governor's reports in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Governor's report not final; subject to judicial review, (ii) Courts can examine: (a) Whether report based on objective material, not subjective opinion, (b) Procedural compliance (e.g., floor test conducted), (c) Constitutional principles compliance (e.g., secularism, democracy), (iii) Courts cannot re-appreciate material, substitute judicial wisdom for Presidential satisfaction, (c) Applications: (i) Rameshwar Prasad (2006): Struck down Bihar Assembly dissolution based on unverified media reports, political considerations, (ii) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Reiterated objective standards, judicial review scope, (d) Rationale: (i) Constitutional supremacy: Governor's report subject to constitutional limits, judicial oversight, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (iii) Democratic legitimacy: Ensures Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Judicial review of Governor's report protects State autonomy; courts ensure constitutional compliance without usurping executive discretion.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, financial relations between Union and States can be modified under Article 354. Which of the following best describes this modification?
- Union can permanently take over State revenues
- President may modify revenue distribution, but modifications must be approved by Parliament and cease post-Emergency
- States lose all financial autonomy permanently
- Finance Commission recommendations become binding on Union
Answer: President may modify revenue distribution, but modifications must be approved by Parliament and cease post-Emergency
Financial relations during Emergency: (a) Article 354: During Emergency, President may modify distribution of revenues between Union and States (e.g., tax devolution, grants-in-aid), (b) Parliamentary approval: Modifications must be approved by Parliament within specified timeframe, (c) Temporal limitation: Modifications cease post-Emergency unless re-approved; federal fiscal normalcy restored, (d) Rationale: Enable coordinated fiscal response to crisis (e.g., war financing, disaster relief) while preserving Parliamentary oversight, State autonomy post-crisis, (e) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Fiscal adjustments for defence spending, resource mobilization, (ii) Post-Emergency: Modifications ceased; Finance Commission recommendations resumed normal operation, (f) Illustrates calibrated fiscal federalism: Enabling coordinated fiscal response to existential threats while preserving State autonomy through Parliamentary approval, time limits, sunset provisions.
Under Article 356, extension of President's Rule beyond one year requires certification by the ______ that elections cannot be held due to extraordinary circumstances, ensuring democratic restoration at earliest opportunity.
- Supreme Court
- Election Commission
- Finance Commission
- Union Public Service Commission
Answer: Election Commission
Election Commission certification for President's Rule extension: (a) 44th Amendment safeguard (1978): Extension of President's Rule beyond 1 year requires: (i) National Emergency in operation in India/State, OR (ii) Election Commission certification that elections cannot be held due to extraordinary circumstances (e.g., security threats, natural disasters), (b) Rationale: (i) Democratic restoration: Ensure elections held at earliest opportunity; President's Rule temporary measure, not permanent governance, (ii) Independent verification: Election Commission as independent constitutional authority certifies genuine impossibility of elections, not political convenience, (iii) Federal balance: Prevents indefinite Centre rule over States without democratic mandate, (c) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to strike down extensions without genuine Election Commission certification, (ii) Political accountability: Government must justify extensions with independent verification, not political preference, (d) Illustrates democratic federalism: Election Commission certification ensures President's Rule extensions reflect genuine extraordinary circumstances; balance between crisis management and democratic restoration.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that secularism is part of the basic structure. Which of the following State actions would likely justify Article 356 imposition based on secularism violation?
- State government promoting regional language in education
- State government enacting law that discriminates against citizens based on religion
- State government implementing Central welfare schemes
- State government requesting additional funds from Union
Answer: State government enacting law that discriminates against citizens based on religion
Secularism test for Article 356: (a) SR Bommai holding: Secularism part of basic structure; State government acting against secularism can justify Article 356, (b) Actions justifying Article 356 based on secularism violation: (i) Enacting laws discriminating based on religion (violates Articles 14, 15, 25-28), (ii) Promoting communal violence, religious discrimination, (iii) Undermining constitutional secularism through official policy, (c) Actions NOT justifying Article 356: (i) Promoting regional language (cultural policy within State domain), (ii) Implementing Central schemes (cooperative federalism), (iii) Requesting funds (normal fiscal federalism), (d) Judicial scrutiny: Courts examine whether action genuinely threatens constitutional secularism, not mere political disagreement or policy difference, (e) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Courts more willing to uphold Article 356 for genuine secularism violations, strike down for political pretext, (ii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy while enabling Union to preserve constitutional order, (f) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Secularism as basic structure enables Union to preserve constitutional order; judicial review ensures Article 356 used for genuine threats, not political convenience.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that judicial review of Article 356 proclamation is limited to examining whether satisfaction was based on objective material, not re-appreciating the material or substituting judicial wisdom for Presidential satisfaction.
- True
- False
Answer: True
Judicial review scope under SR Bommai: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Judicial review permitted: Courts can examine whether Presidential satisfaction based on objective material, not mala fide or political considerations, (ii) Limited scope: Courts cannot re-appreciate material, substitute judicial wisdom for Presidential satisfaction; review limited to procedural compliance, relevance of material, constitutional principles compliance, (iii) Floor test principle: Courts can examine whether floor test conducted, results respected, as objective verification of majority, (c) Applications: (i) Rameshwar Prasad (2006): Struck down Bihar Assembly dissolution based on unverified media reports, political considerations, (ii) Recent Governor cases (2022-2024): Reiterated objective standards, limited judicial review scope, (d) Rationale: (i) Separation of powers: Courts respect executive/legislative domain while ensuring constitutional compliance, (ii) Federal balance: Judicial review protects State autonomy without usurping Presidential discretion, (iii) Democratic legitimacy: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates calibrated judicial review: Courts guard constitutional boundaries without substituting policy judgment; balance between judicial oversight and executive discretion in federal crises.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the distribution of legislative powers between Union and States is temporarily modified. Which of the following best describes this modification?
- State List subjects become exclusively Union subjects permanently
- Parliament can legislate on State List subjects, but such laws cease 6 months post-Emergency
- State Legislatures lose all legislative powers permanently
- Concurrent List subjects become Union-exclusive permanently
Answer: Parliament can legislate on State List subjects, but such laws cease 6 months post-Emergency
Legislative powers during Emergency: (a) Article 250: During Emergency, Parliament can legislate on any matter in State List, (b) Temporal limitation: Laws made under Article 250 cease to operate 6 months after Emergency ceases, except for things done/omitted before expiry, (c) Rationale: Enable unified national response to existential threats while preserving State legislative domain post-crisis, (d) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Parliament legislated on defence, security matters affecting States, (ii) Post-Emergency: Laws ceased after 6 months unless re-enacted by Parliament/State Legislatures, (e) Federal balance: Temporary enhancement of Union legislative power for crisis management, reversible post-Emergency to restore federal normalcy, (f) Illustrates adaptive federalism: Enabling coordinated national response to existential threats while preserving State autonomy through time limits, sunset provisions.
Under Article 163, the Governor acts on aid and advice of Council of Ministers except in limited discretionary situations. Which of the following is a legitimate discretionary power of Governor under Article 356?
- Dismissing Ministry based on subjective assessment without floor test
- Sending report to President based on objective material of constitutional breakdown
- Appointing Chief Minister based on political preference
- Dissolving Assembly without Parliamentary approval
Answer: Sending report to President based on objective material of constitutional breakdown
Governor's discretionary powers under Article 356: (a) Constitutional framework: Article 163 - Governor acts on aid and advice of Council of Ministers except in limited discretionary situations, (b) Legitimate discretion under Article 356: (i) Sending report to President based on objective material of constitutional breakdown (e.g., loss of majority verified through floor test, breakdown of constitutional machinery), (ii) NOT legitimate: Dismissing Ministry without floor test, appointing CM based on political preference, dissolving Assembly without Parliamentary approval, (c) SR Bommai safeguards: (i) Objective material requirement: Report must be based on verified facts, not subjective opinion, (ii) Floor test principle: Majority tested on Assembly floor, not Governor's assessment, (iii) Judicial review: Courts examine whether report based on objective material, not political considerations, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1994: Governors more cautious in recommending President's Rule; floor test, objective material required, (ii) Judicial oversight: Courts strike down proclamations based on unverified reports, political considerations, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Governor's discretion limited to genuine constitutional breakdown; safeguards protect State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion.
Under Article 359, during a National Emergency, the President may suspend enforcement of Fundamental Rights except Articles ______, which cannot be suspended even during Emergency per the 44th Amendment.
- 14 and 19
- 20 and 21
- 25 and 26
- 32 and 226
Answer: 20 and 21
Article 359 non-suspendable rights: (a) Constitutional provision: During Emergency, President may suspend enforcement of Fundamental Rights via Presidential order under Article 359, (b) 44th Amendment safeguard (1978): Articles 20-21 cannot be suspended even during Emergency: (i) Article 20: Protection in respect of conviction for offences (no ex-post facto law, no double jeopardy, no self-incrimination), (ii) Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty, (c) Rationale: Prevent recurrence of 1975-77 Emergency excesses where habeas corpus petitions were suspended (ADM Jabalpur case); preserve core rights essential to human dignity, rule of law, (d) Applications: (i) Post-1978: Even during Emergency, citizens can challenge detention, conviction violations under Articles 20-21, (ii) Judicial review: Courts retain power to examine whether Emergency proclamation, Presidential orders comply with constitutional limits, (e) Illustrates calibrated rights protection: Enabling crisis response while preserving core rights essential to human dignity, rule of law; balance between national security and individual liberty.
In SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that Governor cannot dismiss a State Ministry without testing majority on Assembly floor through floor test, ensuring democratic verification of loss of majority.
- True
- False
Answer: True
SR Bommai floor test requirement: (a) Context: Challenge to President's Rule imposition without floor test in multiple States, (b) Supreme Court holding: (i) Floor test primary method to test whether Ministry enjoys majority support in Assembly, (ii) Governor cannot dismiss Ministry based on subjective assessment, media reports, political considerations without floor test, (iii) Floor test ensures democratic verification: Elected representatives, not appointed Governor, decide government fate, (c) Applications: (i) Hung Assembly scenarios: Governor must invite leader most likely to command majority, verify through floor test, (ii) Judicial review: Courts can examine whether floor test conducted fairly, results respected, (iii) Federal balance: Protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach via gubernatorial discretion, (d) Rationale: (i) Democratic legitimacy: Elected Assembly represents people's will; floor test ensures Ministry reflects Assembly majority, (ii) Constitutional morality: Governor as constitutional functionary, not political agent, (iii) Judicial oversight: Courts ensure Article 356 used for genuine constitutional breakdown, not political ends, (e) Illustrates constitutional federalism: Floor test as democratic standard ensures State governments reflect Assembly majority; judicial review protects State autonomy against arbitrary Centre overreach.
During a National Emergency under Article 352, the executive power of States:
- Is completely abolished and taken over by Union
- Continues to exist but Union can give directions on manner of exercise for coordinated crisis response
- Is transferred to Governor permanently
- Is suspended until Emergency ceases
Answer: Continues to exist but Union can give directions on manner of exercise for coordinated crisis response
State executive during Emergency: (a) Article 353(b): During Emergency, Union executive power extends to giving directions to States on 'manner of exercise' of executive power, (b) State executive continuity: (i) State executive not abolished; Governor, Council of Ministers continue to function, (ii) Union directions relate to coordinated crisis response (defence, security, resource allocation), not general policy, (iii) Post-Emergency: State executive resumes full autonomy; Union directions cease, (c) Rationale: Ensure unified national response to existential threats while preserving State executive structure for post-crisis restoration, (d) Applications: (i) 1962, 1971 Emergencies: Union directions for defence coordination, resource mobilization, (ii) Post-Emergency: State executive autonomy restored; federal normalcy resumed, (e) Illustrates federal flexibility: Temporary enhancement of Union executive control for crisis management, reversible post-Emergency to restore State autonomy; balance between national security and federal autonomy.