Polity – MCQ – GK Questions

Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024): 5-judge bench unanimously struck down Electoral Bonds Scheme (2018) holding: (a) Anonymous political funding violates voters' right to know (implicit in Article 19(1)(a)), (b) Disproportionate impact on transparency, (c) Potential for quid pro quo corruption. Directed ECI to disclose bond donor-recipient details. Landmark transparency judgment.

Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Hon'ble Speaker Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020): SC held Speaker must decide Tenth Schedule petitions within reasonable time (suggested 3 months); unreasonable delay undermines law's efficacy. Court can intervene if delay causes irreversible harm. Highlighted need for parliamentary amendment to fix timeframe; reform still pending.

Section 29B, R.P. Act: Political parties can accept donations; donations above ₹20,000 must be reported to ECI with donor details. Electoral Bonds Scheme (2018-2024) allowed anonymous donations via banks, but Supreme Court struck it down in 2024 (Association for Democratic Reforms case) citing transparency and right to information. Ongoing debate on political funding reforms.

Tenth Schedule doesn't prescribe time limit for Speaker's decision on disqualification petitions. Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh case (2020) recommended Parliament amend Schedule to specify timeframe (e.g., 3 months) except in exceptional cases. Delayed decisions undermine anti-defection law's deterrent effect; reform pending.

Paragraph 2(1)(b) proviso: If member votes/abstains contrary to whip without prior permission, disqualification can be avoided if party condones the act within 15 days. Condonation must be explicit; implied approval insufficient. This allows parties flexibility to handle genuine dissent while maintaining discipline on critical votes.

Paragraph 6(1) of Tenth Schedule: Speaker of Lok Sabha/State Assembly or Chairman of Rajya Sabha/State Council decides disqualification petitions. Their decision is subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan case, 1992). Controversy exists over Speaker's impartiality when belonging to ruling party; reforms debated to transfer power to independent tribunal.

Paragraph 4 of Tenth Schedule: Merger exception - disqualification doesn't apply if original party merges with another party, OR if not less than 2/3 of members of legislature party agree to merge. This allows genuine ideological realignments while preventing small-group defections. 91st Amendment removed 'split' exception (1/3 rule) to curb defections.

Tenth Schedule was inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 to curb political defections. It contains provisions for disqualification of members of Parliament and State Legislatures on grounds of defection. Aimed at promoting political stability and preventing horse-trading in legislatures.

Indian federalism: (a) Division of powers via three Lists, but residuary powers with Union, (b) States have executive/legislative autonomy in State List, but Union can legislate during Emergency/with Rajya Sabha resolution, (c) Financial autonomy via tax devolution, but Finance Commission and GST Council ensure coordination, (d) Governor as bridge between Centre-State. Designed for unity in diversity: flexible enough for regional needs, strong enough for national challenges.

Article 301: Freedom of trade/commerce/intercourse throughout India. Article 302: Parliament may impose restrictions in public interest. Article 303(1): Neither Parliament nor State Legislature can make law giving preference to one State over another or discriminating between States by virtue of any entry in Lists. Exception: Article 303(2) allows preference to address scarcity of goods. Balances economic unity with regulatory needs.

Article 248: Residuary powers vested with Parliament (Union). Includes power to make laws on any matter not enumerated in Concurrent or State List, including power to impose taxes not mentioned in either List. Gives Indian federalism strong unitary bias, unlike USA where residuary powers rest with States. Reflects Constituent Assembly's priority for national unity post-Partition.

Article 345: State Legislature may adopt: (a) any language in use in State, OR (b) Hindi, as official language(s). Subject to Article 346 (language for communication between States/with Union) and Article 347 (President's direction for recognition of language). Balances State linguistic autonomy with national integration needs.

Article 262(2): Parliament may exclude jurisdiction of Supreme Court/other courts over inter-State water disputes. Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956: Tribunals' awards have same force as Supreme Court orders; binding on parties. 2019 amendment makes awards final and binding, with implementation monitoring mechanism. Balances judicial finality with specialized expertise.

Article 279A(9): GST Council decisions by 3/4th majority of weighted votes: (a) Union Government: 1/3 vote weight, (b) All State Governments collectively: 2/3 vote weight. Ensures neither Union nor States can dominate; requires consensus on GST rates, exemptions, thresholds. Exemplifies cooperative fiscal federalism in practice.

Article 256: States must exercise executive power to ensure compliance with Parliament laws and existing laws; Union may give directions. Article 257: Extends to Union directions on matters like construction/maintenance of means of communication of national/military importance, protection of railways, etc. Ensures national policy implementation while respecting State executive domain.

Article 254(1): In repugnancy between Union and State law on Concurrent List, Union law prevails. Exception under Article 254(2): If State law reserved for President's consideration and receives assent, it prevails in that State (but Parliament can still override by subsequent law). Balances Union supremacy with State flexibility.

Writ jurisdiction (Articles 32, 226) is cornerstone of Indian constitutionalism: (a) Enforces Fundamental Rights and legal rights, (b) Checks executive/judicial excesses through judicial review, (c) Ensures accountability via Mandamus, Certiorari, etc., (d) Adapts to new challenges through PIL, continuing mandamus. Empowers courts as guardians of Constitution and protectors of citizens' rights against State power.

Natural justice principles: (a) Audi alteram partem (hear the other side: right to notice, hearing, cross-examination), (b) Nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be judge in own cause: rule against bias). Violation of either can be ground for Certiorari to quash order of judicial/quasi-judicial body. Ensures fair procedure in administrative/judicial decisions.

Quo Warranto conditions: (a) Office must be substantive (not mere employment/function), (b) Created by Constitution/statute, (c) Public in character (governmental function), (d) Person must assert claim to office, (e) Claim must be without legal authority. Not issued for: (a) Private offices, (b) Offices held at pleasure, (c) Mere declarations of right.

Habeas Corpus not issued if: (a) Detention is lawful (e.g., valid conviction, preventive detention with procedural safeguards under Article 22), (b) Proceeding is for contempt of court/legislature, (c) Detention by competent court. However, if preventive detention violates procedural safeguards (e.g., no communication of grounds, no advisory board), HC/SC can issue Habeas Corpus.